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GAUGING AN ADEQUATE PROBABLE CAUSE
STANDARD FOR PROVISIONAL ARREST IN
LIGHT OF PARRETTI v. UNITED STATES
Jeffrey M. Olson'

International extradition maintains a peculiar status in the international legal community.! The current patchwork of treaties requires the

+J.D. Candidate, May 1999, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
1. Extradition is defined as the "surrender by one state or country to another of an
individual accused or convicted of an offense outside its own territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and punish him, demands the
surrender." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 585 (6th ed. 1990). International extradition is
unique in that it is not based on customary international law, see United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886); rather, it is based traditionally on reciprocity, comity, or a treaty. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED
STATES LAW AND PRACrICE 5-7 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing the fundamental bases of contemporary international extradition). Today, most extradition occurs based on treaties,
either bilateral or multilateral. See id. at 6; cf. infra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing types of extradition treaties).
The history of international extradition traces its roots to a treaty between Rameses II
of Egypt and the Hittite prince Hattusili III, dated near 1280 B.C. See I.A. SHEARER,
EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1971). For an overview of this history, see
BASSIOUNI, supra, at 1-5 (surveying the development of international extradition). Since
that time, the purpose of international extradition has evolved from the exchange of political fugitives to the cooperative efforts of states to suppress crime. See id. at 4.
2. International extradition treaties are either bilateral or multilateral.
See
BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 6. Today, most countries including the United States require
a treaty in order to extradite, although there are several instances where extradition has
occurred in the absence of a treaty. See id. at 6-7; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3181(a) (West
Supp. 1998) (requiring a treaty between the United States and another country before an
extradition can occur except in the case of crimes of violence against United States nationals). Since 1996, the United States has permitted extradition without a treaty when the
crimes involve violence against Americans in foreign countries. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3181
(b), (c) (West Supp. 1998) (requiring evidence of such crimes that would constitute violent
crimes had they occurred in United States territory and that are not politically motivated).
Such instances are rare and usually are based on the concepts of reciprocity or comity
which essentially represent friendly cooperation between states. See 18 U.S.C.A. §
3181(b) (West Supp. 1998) (indicating that comity shall be the basis of extradition between
the United States and a foreign country in the absence of a treaty); see also BASSIOUNI,
supra note 1, at 17-18. To extradite without a treaty, a state must have enforcement jurisdiction over a fugitive. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 790-94, 813-18 (2d ed. 1995). Under international law, enforcement jurisdiction is
territorial. See id. at 790. Consequently, states do not enforce their laws in another state
without the consent of the other state. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 432 cmt. b (1987) [hereinafter
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synthesis of different legal systems and customs that often conflict with
one another A consequence of this fusion of interests and ideas is the
unique application of American law to this system.4 Of recent particular

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS].

Though criticized for the lack of uniformity among them, bilateral treaties dominate extradition practice because of their flexibility and the tradition of enacting such treaties for
extradition purposes. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 16-17. Multilateral treaties are
newer and rarer but continue to earn gradual acceptance among countries as international
crime has flourished. See id. at 11-16 (discussing the major multilateral extradition treaties).
3. Two areas of conflict include the role of a treaty in international extradition and
the standard of proof in a judicial proceeding. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 2, at
814. A brief comparison of American, British, and French approaches reflects the similarities and differences between the countries' procedures for extradition. See id. at 817.
The extradition treaty differs in its role in each of the three countries. See id. In the
United States, a treaty is generally required for extradition, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3181 (West
Supp. 1998), and the treaty is supplemented by the U.S. extradition statute, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3184 (West Supp. 1998), which governs the procedures for extradition. These procedures usually vary by treaty. In the United Kingdom, the Extradition Act of 1989, ch. 33,
reprinted in 17 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 558 (4th ed. 1993),

governs all extradition treaties and procedures uniformly. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra
note 2, at 817 (citing the repealed Extradition Act of 1870). French extradition procedures
are similar to those of the United States in that they are established through treaties and
supplemented by a statute, Title II of the Law of March 10, 1927. See id.
The evidentiary standards of proof differ as well. See id. While the American and British standards are essentially standards of probable cause, the French standard is lower.
See id. Proof under the French standard requires only evidence that there are pending
charges or a conviction against the fugitive. See id.; see also infra note 325 and accompanying text (discussing the French standard of proof).
Extradition treaties often resolve most of these intersystem conflicts. Cf BASSIOUNI,
supra note 1, at 5-6 (explaining the states' obligation to extradite based on an explicit
treaty in the absence of a recognized implicit duty to do so). Specifically, two concepts
represent the resolution of most of these disputes through extradition treaties. One common axiom is aut dedere autjudicare or the duty to extradite or prosecute a fugitive within
a state's territorial jurisdiction. See id. at 5. The United States has not recognized this
concept, instead allowing the Executive Branch to exercise discretion in extradition matters. See id. at 108. Notably, however, the U.S. Constitution recognizes customary international law as binding. See id. at 108-09; see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900) (recognizing that customary international law is binding upon American courts).
Another common principle reflected throughout most extradition treaty provisions is the
application of the law of the "Requested State." See, e.g., Extradition Treaty between the
United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, June 20, 1978, U.S.-F.R.G., art. 27,
32 U.S.T. 1485, 1510 [hereinafter U.S.-Germany Extradition Treaty]. In other words, the
country whose duty under international law is to extradite a fugitive will apply its own law
in the extradition proceedings and the requesting state has an obligation to respect that
law. See id.
4. See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing unique applications of
U.S. law in extradition hearings).
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interest is the application of probable cause5 to international extradition.6
Defining and applying probable cause invariably has been one of the
most troublesome problems in American criminal law.' In the domestic
criminal context, courts have achieved some success in clarifying the
proper application of the standard." In the international extradition context, however, probable cause has been defined and applied inconsistently.9 This incongruity is due primarily to two reasons. First, the stat-

5. The source of the probable cause requirement in the United States Constitution is
the Fourth Amendment, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST.

amend. IV.

6. See Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 747-48 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that the
language of the U.S.-Italian Extradition Treaty requires a showing of probable cause before the issuance of a provisional arrest warrant).
7. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (recognizing that probable cause is
"a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules"); United States v.
Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (observing that probable cause is a "'plastic concept whose existence depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case"'
(quoting Bailey v. United States, 389 F.2d 305, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
Also note the subtle difference between "probable cause to arrest" and "probable cause
to search," a fine distinction that has confused many judges, lawyers, and even law students in the past. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.1(b), at 6 (3d ed. 1996). The distinction can be drawn by
defining "probable cause to search" as showing a substantial probability that the wanted
goods are in the place being searched; "probable cause to arrest," however, involves
showing that an arresting officer had "'reasonable grounds to believe"' that a crime had
been committed by the suspect before arresting him. Id. § 3.1(b), at 7-8. The focus of this
Note will be on the probable cause to arrest.
For an analysis of the history of probable cause, see generally Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 114-16 (1975); LAFAVE, supra, § 3.1 at 2-3 (quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98 (1959), which discusses the early foundations of probable cause in American law).
8. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31 (emphasizing the need to weigh the
"totality-of-the-circumstances" in order to determine whether probable cause is met);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (explaining that probable cause is
based on probabilities and requires a balancing of the interests of a detained individual
with those of the community and law enforcement). For a thorough discussion of the
probable cause standard in U.S. domestic law, see generally LAFAVE, supra note 7, §§ 3.13.7, at 1-393.
9. Compare United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553-54 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding
that 18 U.S.C. § 3184 requires a sworn complaint and a showing that the crime is extraditable for establishment of probable cause in provisional arrest), with Parretti v. United
States, 122 F.3d 758, 773 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding § 3184 unconstitutional for not requiring
an adequate showing of probable cause for provisional arrest, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment), op. withdrawn en banc, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998).
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utes' ° and treaties" defining the extradition process fail to outline clearly
the proper standards required to arrest and extradite a fugitive. Second, the nature of the extradition process differs from that of a regular
trial, and thus requires modified applications of the law. 4 This incoherence of definition and application has forced American courts to make
many inferences as to how to determine probable cause in extradition
hearings.'5 Over time, courts have been able to apply probable cause
successfully in extradition hearings by considering the special nature of
the process. 6 Courts, however, have met with less success in applying
probable cause to other stages of the extradition process particularly in
the provisional arrest phase. 7
Provisional arrest of a fugitive is the first significant step of the extradition process. 8 This step is designed to be temporary in nature and is
taken in anticipation of a formal extradition hearing," Informality and
10. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184 (1994) (establishing the general international extradition procedure for the United States).
11. There are currently extradition treaties between the United States and more than
100 other countries. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3181 (West Supp. 1998) (listing these countries).
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994) (including no reference to a probable cause standard
either to arrest or extradite, other than requiring "evidence sufficient" to extradite); Extradition Treaty, Jan. 6, 1909, U.S.-France, art. IV, 37 Stat. 1526, 1529-30 [hereinafter U.S.France Extradition Treaty] (detailing the required information necessary for provisional
arrest, without specifically identifying a probable cause requirement for arrest).
13. See Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888) (noting that the nature of the
extradition hearing is unlike that of trial, and more like that of a domestic preliminary
hearing); Wiebe, 733 F.2d at 554 (discussing the effect of "bureaucratic sluggishness" on
the extradition process, due to the extensive collection and translation of international
documents).
14. See, e.g., Yordi v. Nolte, 215 U.S. 227, 231-32 (1909) (allowing the use of hearsay
in extradition proceedings); Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 185 (1902) (allowing for a limited
sufficiency of the complaint at an extradition hearing); FED. R. EvID. 1101(d)(3) (indicating that the Federal Rules of Evidence are inapplicable to extradition proceedings).
15. See Benson, 127 U.S. at 463 (equating the character of an extradition hearing to
that of a domestic probable cause hearing following arrest); Wiebe, 733 F.2d at 553 (describing the probable cause standard for extradition).
16. See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316 (1922) (determining that the function of
the magistrate is to ascertain the competency of the evidence to hold the fugitive); Wiebe,
733 F.2d at 553 (describing the probable cause standard for extradition); Greci v. Birknes,
527 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding that federal domestic probable cause standard is
appropriate for extradition hearings).
17. Compare In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1217 (5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing the informal nature of the evidence presented at a provisional arrest hearing), with
Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 1980) (inferring a higher probable cause
standard than was used traditionally for provisional arrest, based on the language of the
U.S.-Italian Extradition Treaty).
18. See infra Part I (describing extradition process in detail).
19. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 675 (introducing a thorough discussion of provi-
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urgency are the essential characteristics of provisional arrest.20
Provisional arrest is a relatively new process in international extradition,2 ' and neither statute nor case law has addressed it adequately. 22 Until recently the constitutionality of provisional arrest remained unchallenged, mainly because of the infrequency of such cases.23 Given the lack
of judicial authority on the subject, the international legal community
was concerned with the constitutionality of a fugitive's detention when
arrests were made with an insufficient or complete lack of a probable
cause showing. 4 At the crux of the issue is the conflict between the liberty interests of the fugitive and the international law enforcement community's interest in ensuring an efficient and effective extradition process. This tension between
interests culminated recently in the case of
25
Parrettiv. United States.

Parrettiinvolved the 1995 arrest by U.S. federal agents of the Italian
financier Giancarlo Parretti following a provisional arrest request issued
by France.26 The provisional arrest warrant issued by a U.S. Magistrate
sional arrest).
20. See Russell, 805 F.2d at 1217-18 (emphasizing the informal and urgent nature of
provisional arrest).
21. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 675 (stating that provisional arrest provisions became common in American extradition treaties in the 1960s); SHEARER, supra note 1, at
200-01 (noting that provisional arrest was first formulated by the French in the midnineteenth century).
22. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 17 (discussing the inadequacy of a definition of what constitutes a proper showing of probable cause in provisional arrest).
23. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 687 (noting the rarity of such cases and anticipating the significance of a case that would attempt to resolve the constitutionality of provisional arrest). Contributing to the dearth of cases, some courts refuse to address the important issues altogether. See Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 748 (2d Cir. 1980)
(refusing to question the constitutionality of the U.S.-Italian Extradition Treaty or
§ 3184).
24. See Russell, 805 F.2d at 1217-18 (holding that the prosecutor established probable
cause thus avoiding a ruling on the constitutionality of the Treaty's requirements); Caltagirone, 629 F.2d at 747 (examining the showing of probable cause for provisional arrest
within the context of the Treaty without having to rule on its constitutionality); see also
BASSIOUNI, supranote 1, at 679, 686-88 (expressing concern about the apparent "de facto"
nature of current extradition practices that allows for "unlawful detention").
25. 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997), op. withdrawn en banc, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998).
The panel originally issued a decision in Parretti v. United States, 112 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir.
1997) on May 6, 1997. The opinion was then amended in August of that year to clarify a
point in their decision. See Parretti,122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997). Finally, the amended
opinion was withdrawn in an en banc decision. See Parretti, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998)
(en banc). This Note will cite to the amended decision for consistency, though the
amendment to that opinion is not central to the focus of this Note. For a discussion of the
amended portion of the decision, see infra note 283.
26. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 761. France sought the arrest of Parretti for financial
crimes related to his acquisition of MGM-United Artists in 1990. See id. American law
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was based on a complaint sworn to by an Assistant U.S. Attorney
(AUSA) that was based solely on a French arrest warrant. 27 Following
his arrest, Parretti argued that the magistrate issued the provisional arrest warrant without first finding probable cause. The district court
judge, however, determined that the government's complaint proved sufficient facts to survive a probable cause challenge.
On his appeal to a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, ° Parretti argued that the warrant issued for his arrest was
invalid under the Fourth Amendment.3' The Ninth Circuit panel reve sed the district court," holding that the magistrate issued the provisional arrest warrant without sufficiently determining probable cause.33
Moreover, the court held that the statutory basis for provisional arrest,
18 U.S.C. § 3184, and the governing provision of the extradition treaty
between the United States and France,34 were unconstitutional because
neither required an independent magistrate to make a determination of
probable cause for provisional arrest.35 The court also held that the rule
of judicial non-inquiry36 was not applicable in this case because of the
enforcement agents arrested Parretti in Los Angeles while he was giving a deposition for a
lawsuit in relation to the purchase. See id. at 760.
27. See id. at 761 & n.1.
28. See id. at 761-62.
29. See id. at 762. In his ruling, the judge further indicated that it was not necessary
for the government to establish probable cause at the provisional arrest hearing, stating
"'[t]hat's what they got [sic] 40 days to clear up and to make a presentation in their extradition proceedings."' Id.
30. The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Norris, Pregerson, and Reinhardt. See id.
at 760.
31. See id. at 762. Specifically, Parretti argued that, first, the arrest warrant did not
contain sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. See id. at 761-62. Second, he argued the arrest was invalid because the magistrate failed to make an adequate probable
cause determination and, in doing so, concluded that probable cause was not required for
a provisional arrest warrant. See id. at 762.
Parretti's case also raised issues related to the denial of his bail application under the
"special circumstances" doctrine, as well as a Due Process claim under the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 763-64. This Note's focus is on probable cause for provisional arrest under the Fourth Amendment; the "special circumstances," Due Process, and Fifth Amendment issues are beyond its scope and will not be discussed here.
32. Judge Norris wrote the panel's opinion, see id. at 760, with Judge Reinhardt concurring, see id. at 781 (Reinhardt, J., concurring), and Judge Pregerson dissenting, see id. at
787 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
33. See id. at 776.
34. U.S.-France Extradition Treaty, supra note 12, art. IV, 37 Stat. at 1529-30.
35. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 773.
36. The rule of judicial non-inquiry requires U.S. courts to refrain from inquiring into
foreign judicial processes, including the means by which a foreign country obtains evidence for probable cause to extradite. See Sahagian v. United States, 864 F.2d 509, 514
(7th Cir. 1988) (applying the rule when a person claimed a violation of his constitutional
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Fourth Amendment issue involved.37 The court ordered Parretti to be
set free, whereupon he fled the country.38
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, heard the
government's appeal of the panel's decision in December 1997"9 and, on
May 1, 1998, dismissed the appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and withdrew the panel's opinion without addressing the constitutional issues ruled on by the panel.4° Despite the withdrawal, the detrirights by Spain in an extradition proceeding); BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 486 (citing
Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1901), where the Court indicated that an American's citizenship does not entitle him to the same constitutional guarantees in a foreign
country as in the United States, and that American courts should recognize and respect
this). Professor Bassiouni cynically notes that the rule of judicial non-inquiry is often invoked by the government when it is in their interest to avoid a ruling against them or as a
delay tactic. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 492.
37. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 767.
38. See id. at 787 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
39. See Appellee's Supplemental Brief, Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th
Cir. 1997) (No. 95-56586); Lis Wiehl, Court Case Challenges U.S. Practicesin Extradition,
N.Y. TIMES, December 22, 1997, at A23.
40. See Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 511 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The fugitive disentitlement doctrine is "long standing" and "is not one of jurisdictional dimensions, but rather one based on equitable considerations." United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 1991). The doctrine provides that an appellate court
may dismiss a defendant's appeal when that defendant flees from justice while his appeal
is pending. See Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 239 (1993) (noting that
the doctrine extends back to Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876)). The disentitlement doctrine is based on several practical considerations. First, if the defendant becomes
a fugitive following his appeal, enforcement of the appellate decision may prove impossible. See Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 239-40. Second, the doctrine recognizes that the
defendant's flight from justice is "tantamount to waiver or abandonment" of his appeal.
Id. at 240; see also Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) ("While such an escape does not strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy, we believe it disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for determination
of his claims."). Finally, dismissal of the fugitive's appeal ensures an "efficient, dignified
appellate practice." Ortega-Rodriguez,507 U.S. at 242.
In the Ninth Circuit panel's decision, the court weighed the applicability of the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 776 n.22. While noting that courts have
discretion in deciding whether to invoke the principle, the court decided that dismissal of
the case, at that time, was inappropriate for two reasons. See id. First, at the time of the
court's opinion, the opportunity to dismiss the appeal had already passed. Following the
panel's issuance of its order releasing Parretti from jail on November 21, 1995, and before
the issuance of its follow-up opinion on May 6, 1997, Parretti had fled the country. See
Parretti,143 F.3d at 510. Thus, the panel reasoned, because the opinion merely was explaining its order, dismissal under the disentitlement doctrine was improper and would
only have been proper had Parretti fled prior to the order. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 776
n.22. In other words, the panel's granting of Parretti's release from jail rendered the use
of the doctrine moot. See id.
The second reason that the panel did not apply the doctrine centered around the adversarial nature of the case. See id. Judge Pregerson had reasoned in his dissent that the
panel should have dismissed the case under the disentitlement doctrine because Parretti's
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mental impact of the panel's decision on the future of international extradition is certain because of the important constitutional questions it
raises. 1 The withdrawn decision already has triggered new apprehenflight undermined the adversarial nature of the appeal. See id. at 787 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (citing Justice Stevens's dissent in United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 724
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). The majority countered his argument, however, saying
that the adversarial nature of the case was not compromised when the fugitive's counsel
continued to pursue the case because of the important constitutional questions involved.
See Parretti,122 F.3d at 776-77 n.22; see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 681-82
n.2 ("This equitable principle [of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine] is wholly irrelevant
when the defendant has had his conviction nullified and the government seeks review
here.").
In the ensuing en banc decision, Judge Pregerson wrote the majority opinion for the
court and dismissed the appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and withdrew
the panel's decision. See Parretti,143 F.3d at 511; see also infra note 41 and accompanying
text (discussing the impact of the withdrawal of the panel's decision on its precedential
value). Judge Pregerson's reasoning in the en banc opinion closely paralleled his dissent in
the panel decision. Compare Parretti,122 F.3d at 787 (Pregerson, J., dissenting), with Parretti, 143 F.3d at 508.
In a strenuous dissent, Judge Reinhardt, who concurred with Judge Norris to form the
majority in the panel decision, argued that the disentitlement doctrine continued to be inapplicable to this appeal. See Parretti,143 F.3d at 511-13 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). As in
the panel decision, Judge Reinhardt noted that the court had granted Parretti relief
through its November 1995 order releasing him from jail, thus making the doctrine inapplicable. See id. at 512-13 ("The purpose of the doctrine is to deny to those who have fled
the court's jurisdiction any benefits of the court system. Here, Parretti received all the relief he could possibly obtain .... "). Moreover, it was the government, not Parretti, who
sought relief from the panel's decision in this appeal and, because the court dismissed the
appeal, the government would continue to suffer from the "precedential effect" of the
panel's opinion. See id. at 513. As a result of the majority's opinion, argued Judge Reinhardt, the law on provisional arrest in the Ninth Circuit makes no sense. See id. at 513
("The fugitive disentitlement doctrine makes sense only when we deny the fugitive some
form of relief from the court, not when we frustrate our own ability to resolve critical constitutional questions.").
41. See Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 1-2, Parretti(No. 95-56586) (indicating that
the panel's decision will make provisional arrest "impossible" and lead to other "grave"
consequences). Though the panel's decision in Parrettiwill lack precedential effect in the
future, see 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 advisory committee's note 5 ("Where an order [from a rehearing en banc] specifies that the opinion of the panel has been withdrawn, that opinion
shall not be regarded as precedent and shall not be cited in either briefs or oral argument
[anywhere in the] Ninth Circuit."), the opinion will have a strong impact on future provisional arrest cases because of the rarity of such cases and the weighty constitutional issues
that were raised in it. See Parretti,143 F.3d at 513 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("Our dismissal of the case will deny Parretti nothing-it is only the government that seeks relief
now, and it seeks relief not from the order we issued, but from the precedential effect of
our opinion on the serious constitutional questions that arise in many extradition cases.");
see also infra note 320 (discussing another controversial extradition case, Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated on jurisdictionalgrounds, 82 F.3d 1081
(D.C. Cir. 1996); although vacated in the D.C. Circuit, its arguments for overturning 18
U.S.C. § 3184 on separation of powers grounds continue to resonate in the international
extradition field).
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sions, particularly in the federal government, about the future of the
United States' role in the international extradition process should the issue re-emerge." Of particular concern to the international law enforcement community is the potential need to renegotiate the one hundred or
so U.S. extradition treaties now in effect and, more significantly, the significant risk of an increased evidentiary burden during such a critically
urgent stage of the extradition process as provisional arrest.43
This Note examines the relationship between probable cause and provisional arrest in the context of the structure and legal history of extradition, particularly the issues brought to light in the panel decision of Parretti v. United States. First, this Note will present an overview of the
extradition process in order to place provisional arrest in its proper context within extradition. Next, this Note will discuss probable cause for
provisional arrest under the governing extradition statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3184, and the extradition treaties that define the requirements for a
foreign country's request for provisional arrest. Exploring this context
further, this Note briefly examines the relevant cases leading up to Parretti that discuss probable cause for a domestic warrant, extradition, and
provisional arrest. This Note will then analyze Parrettiand the likely impact it will have on future extradition cases despite the withdrawal of the
panel opinion. Finally, this Note concludes that the Parretticourt properly decided that probable cause is required for provisional arrest but
suggests that there are major flaws in the court's analysis, including its
fa!iurle to properly consider prior case law and the inherently unique nature of provisional arrest itself. In essence, this Note urges courts to consider provisional arrest precedent and its unique nature when these questions are raised again in future cases.
I. GRASPING THE BIG PICTURE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE EXTRADITION

PROCESS44

The extradition process generally commences when a requesting state

42. See Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 1-2, Parretti (No. 95-56586) (citing government fears of the impact of the panel's decision on U.S. extradition practices); Interview
with Mary Jo Grotenrath, Associate Director, Department of Justice, Criminal Division,
Office of International Affairs, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 22, 1997).
43. Interview with Mary Jo Grotenrath, supra note 42.
44. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 654-91 (providing a thorough overview of U.S.
extradition procedure and the role of provisional arrest within it); see also 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3181, 3184, 3186, 3188-95 (West Supp. 1998) (governing U.S. extradition procedures);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 478 (1987) (detailing its recommended international extradition procedure).
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issues a Request for Provisional Arrest to the requested state. 45 The primary purpose of provisional arrest is to detain fugitives who are likely to
flee once they become aware of proceedings to extradite them. An extradition treaty between the United States and the requesting state governs the procedures for provisional arrest and may vary from country to
country.47 The U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Office of
International Affairs (DOJ) in Washington, D.C. receives all provisional
arrest requests either directly or through diplomatic channels from the
requesting country.48
Generally, a copy of the foreign arrest warrant and supporting information accompanies the provisional arrest request, however, some treaties allow for requests based on certain documents transmitted through
Interpol.49 Interpol offers an efficient and convenient method of transmitting information concerning international fugitives between national
law enforcement agencies. 0 Interpol information, however, lacks the le45. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 654. In this Note, "requesting state" will refer to
the foreign country who has an extradition treaty with the United States. The "requested
state" in this Note will refer to the United States. The process for the United States requesting extradition of a fugitive from a foreign state is a separate, though similar, process
that is outside the scope of this Note. See generally BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 654-776
(reviewing the extradition process and requirements).
46. See id. at 682.
47. See id. at 654. Most of these treaties contain provisions outlining provisional arrest procedures. See id. at 655 n.29. For examples of such provisions, see U.S.-Germany
Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, art. 16, 32 U.S.T. at 1500-01; Extradition Treaty between
the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 8,
1972, U.S.-U.K., art. VIII, 28 U.S.T. 227, 232 [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty];
U.S.-France Extradition Treaty, supra note 12, art. IV, 37 Stat. at 1529-30. For further discussion of the status of treaties between the United States, United Kingdom, and France,
see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
48. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 675-76.
49. See id. at 682-84. Interpol (the International Criminal Police Organization)
serves as a liaison for national police organizations to exchange information about international fugitives from justice. See generally U.S. DEP'TS OF JUSTICE AND TREASURY,
INTERPOL-U.S.
NATIONAL CENTRAL BUREAU:
POINT OF CONTACT FOR
INTER ATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, n.d. [hereinafter INTERPOL PAMPHLET] (providing an overview of Interpol's functions and processes). There are approximately 177 current member countries that take part in Interpol, including the United States. See id. Because the United States lacks a "national" police force per se, the Interpol-U.S. National
Central Bureau (USNCB) serves as a communication center to relay information about
fugitives to and from the various federal, state, and local police organizations in the
United States. See id. USNCB's headquarters are in the Justice Department. See id.
50. See INTERPOL PAMPHLET, supra note 49. Interpol assists in international law
enforcement by issuing color-coded notices that detail information about fugitives and the
crimes for which they are wanted. See id. Although these notices take the form of arrest
warrants in some respects, they are not arrest warrants and rarely are relied upon as a basis for a complaint in a provisional arrest or extradition hearing. Interview with Mary Jo
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gal status of an arrest warrant, thus limiting its utility in provisional arrest
requests." Regardless of the method, the provisional arrest request often
is made on an urgent basis and the documents received by DOJ are often
minimal and informal.
After receiving the provisional arrest request, DOJ reviews it to determine its sufficiency53 and sends it to the AUSA in the district where
the fugitive is reportedly located 4 The AUSA then attaches the request
to an affidavit, which is filed before the appropriate federal magistrate.
Based on these documents, the magistrate decides whether to issue an
arrest warrant for the fugitive." Upon approval of the warrant, federal
officials can arrest the fugitive.
Following arrest, the fugitive is entitled to a bail hearing where he
must prove "special circumstances" in order to be released on bail.5 If
Grotenrath, supra note 42; cf BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 683. Generally, if the Interpol
notice is supplemented with other relevant judicial documents, the notice may be considered by the court. See id. at 683-84. Efforts are currently underway to increase the usefulness of such notices by requiring more information and documentation about the fugitive
from the requesting country. Interview with Mary Jo Grotenrath, supra note 42.
51. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 683; see also supra text accompanying note 50
(discussing the status of an Interpol notice compared to an arrest warrant).
52. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 682-83. Often, the information for a request for
provisional arrest is received by fax or telex and includes identifying material (i.e., a description of the fugitive and his believed whereabouts), a statement that the request is
made pursuant to and meets the requirements of the governing treaty, and a statement
that the requesting state intends to issue a formal request for extradition within the required time frame. See id.
53. Interview with Mary Jo Grotenrath, supra note 42. At this stage of the process,
DOJ may approve or reject the request for provisional arrest. See BASSIOUNI, supra note
1, at 682 (noting that most provisional arrest clauses are discretionary for forty to sixty
days); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 478 cmt. a (1987). DOJ attorneys will attempt to establish that the request meets the requirements for arrest, particularly whether probable cause can be established. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 682-83;
see also Interview with Mary Jo Grotenrath, supra note 42.
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 478 cmt. a (1987). If the
fugitive is known to be in or about to enter the United States, yet his specific destination
or whereabouts is unknown, the AUSA may petition the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia for an arrest warrant. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 681.
55. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 682-83.
56.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 478(2)(a). If a warrant

is not obtained, the government must show that such urgency existed so that there was not
time to request an issuance of a warrant. See id. § 478, reporter's note 1.
57. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 655. The federal jurisdiction of extradition was
established by the first extradition statute, passed in 1848. See id. at 67 & n.162.
58. See id. at 692 (citing Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 63 (1903), which introduced
the concept). "Special circumstances," which relate to the granting of bail in U.S. extradition hearings, are those where "the requirements of justice [warranting the granting of bail
as opposed to imprisonment] are absolutely peremptory." In re Mitchell, 171 F. 289, 289
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 692-93 (citing Mitchell). Re-
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the fugitive fails to receive bail, authorities may detain him for a period
usually ranging from thirty to sixty days under the provisional arrest warrant. 9 During this time, the requesting government gathers the required
documents for submission to the United States in a formal extradition
request. 60 If the requesting state fails to provide the material before the
end of the allowed detention, the provisional arrest warrant ceases to be
valid and the governmentmust release the captive.6'
After executing the provisional arrest request, the requesting state furnishes the United States with any additional information that is required
for extradition under the governing statute and treaty. 62 Most often these
documents include a sworn complaint stating the necessary facts and history of the case,63 the foreign arrest warrant and/or charging document,
any indictments or depositions, and any other related evidence that may
suffice to satisfy probable cause for extradition. 64 Additionally, the requesting state may supplement these documents with a conviction record. 65 The AUSA then files the formal extradition request and supporting documentation before the appropriate federal magistrate or district
court judge, who conducts the extradition hearing. 66
cently, many courts have interpreted "special circumstances" liberally. See id. at 693-94.
59. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 682; see also U.S.-Germany Extradition Treaty,
supra note 3, art. 16, 32 U.S.T. at 1500-01 (40 days); Extradition Treaty, June 22, 1972,
U.S.-Denmark, art. 12, 25 U.S.T. 1293, 1304 (30 days); U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra
note 47, art. VIII, 28 U.S.T. at 232 (45 days); U.S.-France Extradition Treaty, supra note
12, art. IV, 37 Stat. at 1529-30 (40 days).
60. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 677, 682.
61. See id. at 681, 685. If the warrant expires and the fugitive is set free, the government may presumably rearrest the fugitive under a new provisional arrest warrant. Cf.
Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 747-48 (2d. Cir. 1980) (noting the concession by the
government that, in effect, it could "string[] together an infinite strand of forty-five day
provisional arrests, all without a judicial determination of probable cause, or a formal extradition request").
62. Interview with Mary Jo Grotenrath, supra note 42; see also BASSIOUNI, supra
note 1, at 658-60, 662-64, 668 (describing the initial extradition process and the authenticated documentation required to accompany an extradition request).
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994) (indicating that a complaint is "made under oath,
charging any person found within [the magistrate's] jurisdiction, with having committed
within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by
such treaty").
64. Interview with Mary Jo Grotenrath, supra note 42; cf BASSIOUNI, supra note 1,
at 663-64 (noting the documents that "must" be attached to the extradition hearing complaint). The probable cause standard for extradition is the same as required under domestic federal law. See supra note 16 (citing cases which compare standards for probable
cause).
65. Interview with Mary Jo Grotenrath, supra note 42; cf BASSIOUNI, supra note 1,
at 663 (noting that a certified judgment of conviction may accompany the extradition
hearing complaint in lieu of an authenticated arrest warrant).
66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 478 cmt. a (1987).
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At the hearing, the judge does not determine the guilt or innocence of
the fugitive.67 Instead, the judge determines whether "evidence sufficient" to extradite the fugitive exists. 6 The Supreme Court has equated
the "sufficient evidence standard" to extradite to that of a probable
cause standard. 69 Upon determining that the fugitive can be extradited,
the judge certifies that fact to the Secretary of State. ° The Secretary
then has the discretion to extradite, depending on the circumstances of
the case.7' For example, the Secretary will consider whether the fugitive

67. See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316 (1922) ("The function of the committing
magistrate is to determine whether there is competent evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial, and not to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a
conviction.").
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994) ("If, on such hearing, [the magistrate] deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty," then the
fugitive can be extradited.). At the hearing, the judge generally asks a series of questions
in order to determine whether the "sufficient evidence standard" for extradition is met,
such as whether there is an extradition treaty in force between the United States and the
requesting country and whether the alleged crime is covered by the treaty. Interview with
Mary Jo Grotenrath, supra note 42. The judge also may seek to determine whether the
party before the court is the one charged with the crime and whether there is probable
cause to believe that this person committed the crime. Id.
69. See Collins, 259 U.S. at 315-16 (explaining that the magistrate's role is to determine the competency of the evidence to justify holding the accused and that the accused
was allowed to present evidence on the issue of probable cause); United States v. Wiebe,
733 F.2d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 1984) (equating the probable cause standard for extradition
with that required for federal law); see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 711 (arguing that
§ 3184 requires a showing of probable cause for an extradition hearing).
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994) (requiring that after sustaining the charge that the
fugitive is extraditable, the magistrate "shall certify the same, together with a copy of all
the testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of State"). The decision to extradite is
non-reviewable by the courts; however, a fugitive who a judge has certified to be extradited may petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 656 (citing
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988)). In fact, this option is available to a fugitive at any time during
the extradition process after his provisional arrest. See id. If several writs are raised during the extradition process, each writ must be based on different legal grounds. See id.
The writs generally are petitioned to either a federal district court or court of appeals. See
id.
71.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 478 cmt. d (1987). The

Secretary is not bound to follow the judicial decision. See id. A United States District
Court recently held this procedure to be unconstitutional as a violation of the separation
of powers. See Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65, 78 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that
§ 3184 is unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 82 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also infra note 320 (listing other sources
which discuss Lobue). Many courts have concluded otherwise, finding § 3184 to be consistent with the separation of powers. See, e.g. Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1327
(9th Cir. 1997); Lo Duca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100, 1103-11 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S. Ct. 508 (1996).
Once a court issues an order for extradition, the Secretary of State must sign a separate
warrant to allow the fugitive to be extradited. Interview with Mary Jo Grotenrath, supra
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is likely to receive a fair trial in the requesting country," or whether the
alleged crime is of a political nature.73 If no circumstances exist that mitigate against extradition, United States Marshals will place the detainee
on a plane back to the requesting state or as otherwise governed by the
extradition treaty. 71 If the evidence at the hearing is not sufficient to warrant extradition, the fugitive is released, 75 and the government may, at its
option, deport the fugitive.76
Unfortunately, the process of extradition does not in itself adequately
explain how to properly apply probable cause at a provisional arrest
hearing. The process does illustrate, however, that there is a subtle difference between the provisional arrest hearing, which is based on the
need for fast, efficient arrest,77 and the extradition hearing, which is
note 42. This process allows the Secretary to bar an extradition for humanitarian or political reasons. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (discussing humanitarian and
political reasons for barring an extradition).
72. The Secretary or the court may bar extradition if there are misgivings about the
fairness of the trial the fugitive may receive in the requesting state or for other human
rights concerns. Cf. GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 79-80 (International Studies in Human Rights Vol. 17, 1991) (discussing alternatives to extradition available to courts to prevent repatriation because of human rights concerns). Generally, however, the rule of judicial non-inquiry will prevent judicial interference. See Glucksman v.
Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911) (holding that the existence of an extradition treaty prevents judicial inquiry into the fairness of foreign trial procedures); BASSIOUNI, supra note
1, at 486-93 (discussing the rule of judicial non-inquiry); supra note 36 (defining the rule of
judicial non-inquiry).
73. See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 523-24 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that the political
offense exception did not bar extradition of a PLO terrorist). The political offense exception is provided for in most extradition treaties to prevent extradition when the fugitive's
alleged crime is of a political nature (i.e., the murder of a government official to further a
political cause). For an in-depth discussion of the exception, see generally BASSIOUNI,
supra note 1, at 502-83; cf. Miriam E. Sapiro, Note, Extraditionin an Era of Terrorism: The
Need to Abolish the Political Offense Exception, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 654, 700-01 (1986)
(advocating the abolishment of the exception because of its exploitation by terrorists).
74. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 657. If the fugitive is not extradited within the
time specified by the treaty, the fugitive may be set free. See id. at 685.
75. See id. at 656; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§ 476(1)(a) (1987).
76.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 478, reporter's note 6

(1987). Generally, deportation proceedings are started before extradition proceedings,
and are stayed pending the outcome of the extradition hearing. See id. Professor Bassiouni has criticized the resort to deportation proceedings following a failed attempt at extradition, calling it a "dual standard" that "flies in the face of the integrity of the legal process." BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 542; see also id. at 167, 184-91 (discussing the
deportation process and calling it "disguised extradition"). Although many European
courts also have criticized such de facto extradition, many of these courts often refuse to
question a deportation order if it is valid on its face. See GILBERT, supra note 72, at 199.
77. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text (discussing the urgency associated
with the provisional arrest stage).
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slower and more deliberate.78 These factors, coupled with an overview of
the statutory and treaty bases for provisional arrest, are key considerations for the proper application of probable cause in provisional arrest.
II. THE FOUNDATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN PROVISIONAL ARREST:
THE STATUTE AND TREATIES

Provisional arrest has its roots in the statutes and treaties that define
extradition. 79 These sources of law, therefore, determine the scope of
provisional arrest, including the parameters of an adequate evidentiary
showing for probable cause. 8° The relevant statutes and treaties, however, do not alone formulate a clear standard.81
A. The Statutory Basis of ProvisionalArrest: Only by Implication?
The statutory basis for international extradition is found in 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3181-96. 2 The current statutes originated in the Extradition Act of
August 12, 1848.83 The specific source of authority to extradite international fugitives from the United States to a foreign country is § 3184. s" It
78. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text (discussing the slower pace of the
extradition hearing).
79. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184, 3187 (1994) (governing extradition); see also BASSIOUNI,
supra note 1, at 675.
80. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 72-100 (discussing statutory and treaty interpretation).
81. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 678 (noting that neither the current extradition
treaties nor relevant statutes indicate the standard of proof required for provisional arrest); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994) (lacking a clear definition of a standard of probable
cause for provisional arrest); U.S.-France Extradition Treaty, supra note 12, art. IV, 37
Stat. at 1529-30 (lacking any reference to an evidentiary standard required to find probable cause for provisional arrest).
82. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-96 (1994).
83. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 36 (offering a general discussion of the history of
18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-96). The original Extradition Act of 1848 stated that a bilateral extradition treaty was required for extradition to occur between the United States and another
country, and outlined the procedures for judicial involvement in the process. See id. Congress has modified the Act several times, most recently in 1996. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3184
(West Supp. 1998) (inserting into § 3184 portions of text referring to § 3181(b)); see also
infra note 105 (reviewing the 1996 amendments). Most of these amendments were technical. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 36; cf. infra note 105 (indicating the significance of
the 1996 amendments following recent terrorist incidents). Congress attempted to broadly
update the statutes between 1981 and 1984 starting with the Extradition Reform Act of
1981. See id. at 36-37. The attempt failed largely because of a lack of will on behalf of
Congress and the Reagan Administration following numerous attempts to pass the legislation. See id. at 47. For a thorough discussion of the attempts at reform of the U.S. extradition process during the 1980s, see BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 36-43.
84. Section 3184, entitled "Fugitives from foreign country to United States" describes
the international extradition process:
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requires an extradition treaty between the United States and the requesting country and outlines the general judicial procedure for extraditing the fugitive from the United States to the requesting country.
There is, however, no express mention in the statute of provisional arrest
as part of the international extradition process. 86 Furthermore, the statute lacks an explicit requirement that the government make a showing of
probable cause for either provisional arrest or extradition.87
Despite the absence of an explicit requirement, the U.S. Supreme
Court has inferred from the statutory language a requirement of showing
probable cause for extradition purposes, although no court has held the
basis to be the Fourth Amendment.8 The Court has equated this showing to that required for a preliminary hearing in domestic arrest situa-

Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United
States and any foreign government, or in cases arising under section 3181(b) [in
absence of a treaty], any justice or judge of the United States... may, upon complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with
having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of
the crimes provided for by such treaty or convention, or provided for under section 3181(b), issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged,
that he may be brought before such [judge], to the end that the evidence of
criminality may be heard and considered. Such complaint may be filed before
and such warrant may be issued by a judge or magistrate of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia if the whereabouts within the United
States of the person charged are not known or, if there is reason to believe the
person will shortly enter the United States. If, on such hearing, he deems the
evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty
or convention, or under section 3181(b), he shall certify the same, together with a
copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of the proper authorities of such foreign government, for the surrender of such person, according to the stipulations of the
treaty or convention; and he shall issue his warrant for the commitment of the
person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain until such surrender shall be
made.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3184 (West Supp. 1998).
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316 (1922) (citing Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181,
197 (1902), and indicating that the "function of the committing magistrate is to determine
whether there is competent evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial, and not
to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction"); cf. BASSIOUNI,
supra note 1, at 711 (noting that, surprisingly, courts have not yet interpreted a showing of
probable cause for extradition out of the Fourth Amendment).
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tions.89 Like preliminary hearings, extradition hearings are less formal 9
in nature than in domestic arrest cases because, first, the use of hearsay9"
and a limited sufficiency of the complaint 92 are allowed and, second,
there is no res judicata effect. 9' Despite such case law development of
the procedures involved in an extradition hearing, courts have made virtually no attempts to require the same determination for provisional arrests, mostly because of the rarity of such cases.

94

In an attempt to clarify its meaning, one extradition expert has advanced an argument that places § 3184 in the context of other extradition
statutes. 95 Using a similar analysis, by examining §§ 3183 and 3187, one
can infer that an adequate probable cause showing is needed for provisional arrest under § 3184. 9' Sections 3183 and 3187 apply to arrest and
extradition within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States.97
Specifically, § 3183 outlines the formal proofs required for extradition.9
Section 3187 allows for the provisional arrest and detention of a fugitive
based only on a telegraphic statement of the requesting authority.99 This

89. See Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888) (comparing the nature of extradition proceedings to those of a domestic probable cause hearing following arrest); cf
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975) (describing the informal nature of such domestic preliminary hearings); see generally Robert J. Rosoff, The Quantum of Evidence Required to Extradite from the United States, in TRANSNATIONAL ASPECrS OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 123-51 (Mich. Y.B. of Int'l Legal Studies, 1983) (reviewing the legal controversy in determining the evidentiary standard required for extradition).
90.. The extradition hearing is "not a full fledged criminal proceeding and is not a trial
on the merits." BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 717.
91. See Yordi v. Nolte, 215 U.S. 227,231-32 (1909) (citing Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371,
375 (1901) and acknowledging that the information required for extradition hearings may
be based on "information and belief").
92. See Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 185 (1902) (indicating that "technical noncompliance with some formality of criminal procedure" should not affect treaty obligations).
93. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 713 (citing Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360 (9th
Cir. 1978)).
94. But see In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1216 (5th Cir. 1986) (approving district court's application of standard of review normally used in extradition hearings
to a provisional arrest hearing).
95. See SHEARER, supra note 1, at 205 n.7. In his discussion, Dr. Shearer examines
U.S. law concerning the powers of arrest without a warrant in international extradition.
See id. Although his discussion does not focus specifically on the appropriate evidentiary
showing required for provisional arrest, a similar analysis can be made here through an
examination of the U.S. statutes on extradition. See id.
96. See id.
97. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3183, 3187 (1994).
98. See 18 U.S.C. § 3183 (requiring a copy of an indictment or affidavit from a magistrate of the demanding jurisdiction that charges the fugitive with an offense and is certified
as authentic by an authorized official).
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 3187 (allowing a provisional arrest request to be sent by telegraph
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document must indicate that the formal documents for extradition are en
route and that an arrest warrant has been issued for the fugitive.1° Based
on that information, the fugitive may be detained for up to ninety days."'
In contrast to §§ 3183 and 3187, § 3184 contains none of this information.102 This comparison leads to the inference that the standards of
§§ 3183 and 3187 do not apply to provisional arrest under § 3184 because
of the canon of interpretation expressio unius est exclusio alterius.°3
Despite such interpretations, the absence of any mention of provisional arrest in the appropriate statute forces the examination of American extradition treaties.'0" These treaties more clearly define the nature
of probable cause in provisional arrest despite their failure to convey a
complete understanding.
B. The Treaty Basis of ProvisionalArrest: Toward a ClearerDefinition
By law, a treaty is necessary in order for extradition to occur.'

5

Be-

by a competent authority to a likewise authority who can authorize the surrender of the
fugitive, as long as it is accompanied by statement that an arrest warrant has been issued).
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See supra note 84 (providing the text of § 3184).
103. See SHEARER, supra note 1, at 206 n.7 (referring to the presumption that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another). Judge Irving Kaufman raised another
canon of interpretation in this context in Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 741 (2d Cir.
1980). The canon he used construes any ambiguous language in a statute or treaty to conform with the Constitution's Framers' intent. See id. Such a construction may infer a necessary probable cause determination for provisional arrest; in other words, the framers of
§ 3184 conformed the statute with the Constitution. For further elaboration of this analysis, see infra Part V (discussing major flaws in the Parretti court's analysis, including the
manner in which it construed § 3184).
104. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, art. 31, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691-92 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (offering guidance on treaty interpretation, starting with analysis of the text itself);
BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 72-77 (describing the process of treaty interpretation in light
of national legislation). The Vienna Convention was opened for signature in May of 1969
and entered into force in January of 1980. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 2, at 110.
Though the United States is not a signatory, the Convention is considered customary international law at the State Department and in several courts. See id.; cf The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (recognizing that customary international law is binding
upon American courts).
105. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184 (1994) (limiting the extradition statute's application
to those times where a treaty was in existence); Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936) ("It is manifest that the [Extradition] Act does not attempt to
confer power upon the Executive to surrender any person ... to a foreign government
where an extradition treaty or convention does not provide for such surrender.").
There is an exception to this rule, however. In 1996, Congress amended § 3181 and
added two new provisions. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3181(b), (c) (West Supp. 1998). These provisions allow for extradition without a treaty, as long as the crime would be categorized as
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•• 106
cause extradition treaties are self-executing,
they carry the same legal
status as national legislation. 107 Like statutes, treaties are subject to limitation by the Constitution. °8 Therefore, in order to construe a proper
application of probable cause for provisional arrest from a treaty, it must
be done within the context of the Constitution, particularly the Fourth
Amendment. °9

"violent" in the United States, is against an American in a foreign country, and is not of a
political nature. See id. These amendments were made as part of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, § 443(a)(2), 110 Stat. 1214, 1280
(1996).
Customary international law does not provide for extradition. See United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886) (indicating that it was not until modern times that
states recognized the obligation to extradite through treaties; prior to that time, there was
no such acknowledged obligation). Extradition treaties operate instead as a contract between two states. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 50-52 (discussing bilateral extradition
treaties). Extradition treaties are not required to be bilateral; there are multilateral extradition treaties as well. See Pan American Convention on Extradition, Dec. 26, 1933, 49
Stat. 3111 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention] (including the United States and other
Latin American states).
106. A "self-executing" treaty is one that is effective immediately upon Senate approval, without any further implementing legislation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 111 cmt. h (1987).
107. See Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902). In case of conflict between a
statute and a treaty, the most recent one takes precedence. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 115 cmt. a.
108. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 115(3); see also Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 (1958) (holding that Congress's power over foreign affairs is
limited by the Constitution); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6, 17 (1957) (holding that the
Constitution is supreme, and therefore limits the power of treaties).
109. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Constitution, including the Fourth Amendment,
applies to both citizens and non-citizens found within the United States. See BASSIOUNI,
supra note 1, at 678-79 (arguing that probable cause applies via the Fourth Amendment,
even if not provided for by treaty or statute); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259, 265, 271 (1990) (noting that the Constitution protects aliens who have entered the United States and have developed "substantial connections" with it, while also
suggesting that, like the First, Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, "the people' protected by the Fourth Amendment ... refers to a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community"); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982) (holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to all persons within the United States' territorial jurisdiction); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 & n.5 (1953) (holding that Fifth
Amendment applies to all people lawfully within the borders of the United States). But
see Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274-75 (holding that the Fourth Amendment did not
apply to search and seizure by U.S. officials of aliens and their property located abroad).
The Supreme Court has determined that treaties must be fairly interpreted so as to carry
out the intentions of the parties and the purpose so intended. See Wright v. Henkel, 190
U.S. 40, 57 (1903). Courts also must construe treaties liberally, beyond what is simply required in the national legislation. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 298 (1933).
Generally, in matters of treaty interpretation, the courts will defer to the executive determination, see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936), except where individual rights are concerned. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
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Since the 1960s, provisional arrest provisions have been made part of
American extradition treaties." According to most of those treaties, the
provisional arrest request must be accompanied by some statement of
the urgency that underlies the provisional arrest."' Generally, however,
the magistrate will assume that the request is made on an urgent basis,
and will not require such a statement."2 This practice is in line with the
basic premise of the1 request-the
fear that the suspect will flee if not de3
immediately.
tained
The request also must be accompanied by sufficient information indicating that the fugitive has committed a crime and will be detained
pending an extradition hearing." 4 The sufficiency of this information has
been compared to the domestic standard of probable cause necessary to
effectuate an arrest."5 Moreover, the treaties usually list a number of
documents that are required for provisional arrest, such as basic information about the fugitive and an arrest warrant."' The treaty provisions on
provisional arrest also include a deadline by which the fugitive must be
set free; it usually ranges from thirty to sixty days. 117 Despite these reRELATIONS § 326, reporters' note 2 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint

Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984)).
110. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 675. Article IV of the U.S.-France Extradition
Treaty describes the provisional arrest process and requirements in some detail:
The arrest and detention of a fugitive may be applied for on information, even by
telegraph, of the existence of a judgment of conviction or of a warrant of arrest.
In both countries, in case of urgency, the application for arrest and detention
may be addressed directly to the competent magistrate in conformity to the statutes in force.
In both countries, the person provisionally arrested shall be released, unless
within forty days from the date of arrest in France, or from the date of commitment in the United States, the formal requisition for surrender with the documentary proofs herein before prescribed be made aforesaid by the diplomatic
agent of the demanding government or, in his absence, by a consular officer
thereof.
U.S.-France Extradition Treaty, supra note 12, art. IV, 37 Stat. at 1529-30.
111. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 677 (discussing need for urgency).
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 677-79 (discussing the requirement for "some type" of probable cause
for provisional arrest).
115. See id. at 678-79 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard
does apply to provisional arrest).
116. See Treaty on Extradition between the United States and Italy, Oct. 13, 1983,
U.S.-Italy, art. XII, 35 U.S.T. 3023, 3034-35 [hereinafter 1983 U.S.-Italy Extradition
Treaty] (describing requirements for provisional arrest); infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text (providing a more detailed description of the required documents).
117. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (citing several treaty provisions detailing the lengths of time for detention under provisional arrest).
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quirements, none of the U.S. extradition treaties explicitly state the type
of showing that is necessary for a provisional arrest warrant to be issued.' This omission leaves the treaties subject to further interpretation
as to what the requisite showing must be." 9
One potential method for determining whether some sort of standard
exists is to compare the type of information required for a provisional arrest to that required for extradition within the treaty itself. 20 In most extradition treaties, the information required to detain a fugitive under
provisional arrest includes detailed information about the fugitive, his
likely location, and the crime allegedly committed; statements or other
evidence that show an arrest warrant or a conviction exists; and an intention to pursue a future extradition request.1 The treaty section on provisional arrest also requires an indication of the urgency of the case because of the potential that the fugitive may flee if not detained
immediately.2 2 Further, most treaties permit the submission of the re118. See, e.g., U.S.-Germany Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, art. 16, 32 U.S.T. at
1500-01; U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 47, art. VIII, 28 U.S.T. at 232; U.S.France Extradition Treaty, supra note 12, Art. IV, 37 Stat. 1529-30.
119. See Vienna Convention, supra note 104, art. 31, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 8
I.L.M. at 691-92 (noting that treaties should be interpreted in the context of the whole
document, following an examination of the text itself); Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739,
747 (2d Cir. 1980) (examining the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty in the context of its structure).
120. See Caltagirone,629 F.2d at 745 (applying a similar, more practical analysis of the
U.S.-Iiaiy Extradition Treaty). Alternatively, comparing the history of negotiation or the
application of each and every extradition treaty to which the United States has signed
would require a much more thorough analysis then the scope of this Note allows,
121. Interview with Mary Jo Grotenrath, supra note 42. Such information generally
includes the fugitive's name and any aliases, date and place of birth, citizenship, sex, race,
height, weight, eye and hair color, and other physical attributes. Id. The information may
also include photographs and/or fingerprints. Id. Other possible documents demanded
from the requesting state are a copy of the fugitive's conviction, the arrest warrant, or
charging document (or at least a statement that one of these documents exists). Id.
Also, the documents accompanying a provisional arrest request usually include the requesting state's assurance that it intends to submit a request for extradition of the fugitive
upon arrest within the time specified by the treaty. See supra note 59 and accompanying
text (noting certain provisions that indicate times of detention under provisional arrest).
For further information on the documents required for provisional arrest, see BASSIOUNI,
supra note 1, at 676-77. American courts have not strictly determined whether these
documents suffice for a proper evidentiary standard to establish probable cause for provisional arrest. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 686-87. But see Caltagirone v. Grant, 629
F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty requires a
probable cause showing); Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 773-75 (9th Cir. 1997)
(suggesting that more information besides a French arrest warrant was needed to establish
probable cause), op. withdrawn en banc, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998).
122. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 677 (discussing the urgent nature of provisional
arrest).
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quest directly between the Department and/or Ministry of Justice rather
than through diplomatic channels."3
Comparatively, the
.
• list
124 of documents required for an extradition request is more extensive. It usually includes an affidavit by the prosecutor that details the facts about the fugitive and the case itself, the related
provisions of law detailing the criminal offenses, related exhibits including the arrest warrant or other charging documents, 2' as well as other
documents that may establish more fully that the fugitive committed the
crime for which the extradition is requested.12 6 The treaty usually requi "es that these documents be supplied only through diplomatic channels, thus slowing down the process by injecting the Department of State
and Ministry of Foreign Affairs into it.127 Given the time needed to
gather, translate, and certify the documents, as well as overcome the inherent bureaucratic sluggishness, 128 the extradition process is also implicitly slower and more formal than the provisional arrest process. Because
of the larger number of documents required and the slower, more deliberate nature of the extradition request, the impracticality of requiring a
similar requisite showing of probable cause for a provisional arrest request is apparent.
Thus, taken together, the treaties and statutes still fail to establish
clearly what constitutes a proper showing of probable cause for provisional arrest. Despite this failure, 129 the statutes and treaties provide a
firm foundation on which courts could develop the law appropriately.

123. See id. at 655, 675-76 (citing article XIII of the 1973 U.S.-Italy Extradition
Treaty).
124. See id. at 663-64 (listing documents required as attachments to the prosecutor's
complaint for an extradition hearing).
125. See id. at 708-11 (identifying the requirements of a "charging" document).
126. Interview with Mary Jo Grotenrath, supra note 42.
127. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 478 cmt. a (1987) (explaining the proper method of filing a request for extradition from the United States);
compare U.S.-France Extradition Treaty, supra note 12, art. IV, 37 Stat. at 1529-30 (allowing provisional arrest request to be made by telegraph), with id., art. III, 37 Stat. at
1529 (allowing extradition requests to be made only through diplomatic channels).
128. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 682 (discussing reasons for bureaucratic sluggishness in international extradition).
129. See Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 772-73 (9th Cir. 1997) (examining
treaty and statute and failing to find a sufficient probable cause requirement), op. withdrawn en banc, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998); Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 744-47 (2d
Cir. 1980) (finding an insufficient requirement for a showing of probable cause in the extradition treaty).
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III. BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION: CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT

The development of case law concerning a probable cause standard for
provisional arrest has been slow and incremental, beginning even before
provisional arrest provisions appeared in extradition treaties. 3 ' Prior to
that time, the courts expended much effort to develop the standard of
Such efforts were interprobable cause as it related to extradition.'
spersed with comparisons to domestic standards of probable cause.'32
Building on inferences drawn from such case law, the courts were able to
develop some understanding of the new concept of provisional arrest.'33
Coupled with these inferences was a growing recognition of human
rights.1 3'4 As a result, the courts concentrated on ensuring that states respected the personal rights of individuals. 13 Yet, until the panel decision
136
in Parrettiv. United States, the probable cause standard for provisional
not been addressed adequately within a constitutional framearrest 3 had
7
work.

A. Domestic Standard Considerations
Throughout the process of developing a probable cause standard
within the context of international extradition law, courts commonly

made comparative references to domestic standards of probable cause to

130. See Yordi v. Nolte, 215 U.S. 227, 230-31 (1909) (discussing the fugitive's prompt
arrest before his extradition hearing); Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 192 (1902) (discussing
informal requirements for complaint).
131. See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316 (1922) (determining that the function of
the magistrate in an extradition hearing is to ascertain the competency of the evidence to
hold the fugitive); Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888) (equating evidentiary
standard for an extradition hearing with that required for a domestic preliminary hearing).
132. See United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 1984) (defining extradition
in the context of the domestic evidentiary standard of probable cause).
133. See id. (citing Collins and Benson in order to establish a probable cause standard
for extradition to define a probable cause standard for provisional arrest).
134. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing human rights concerns in
extradition).
135. See United States v. Williams, 480 F. Supp. 482, 485 (D. Mass. 1979) (discussing
concerns about thirty day detention of fugitive without an adequate showing of probable
cause), rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 914 (1st Cir. 1979).
136. 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997), op. withdrawn en banc, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998).
137. See Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 1980) (comparing articles
within the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty to resolve the case without having to delve into
the constitutionality of the extradition treaty under probable cause); cf. Parretti,143 F.3d
at 512 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and the withdrawal of the panel's opinion and arguing that it
was the duty of the court to decide the merits of the case).
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arrest."' Even on the domestic front, defining such a standard is not
easy. 3 9 Two cases are useful to examine, however, in understanding the
proper application of probable cause for provisional arrest.
The first of these cases, Brinegar v. United States,14 helped to define
the interests involved in establishing a proper probable cause determination. " ' In Brinegar,police arrested an interstate alcohol smuggler after
he admitted to them that he had alcohol in his car. 42 Upholding Brinegar's conviction, Justice Rutledge reasoned that probable cause must be
based on probabilities and must balance the interests of the detained individual with the interests of the community in maintaining a safe environment.1 43 The Court explained that, although evidence must be sufficient enough to lead a reasonable person to believe that a crime had
been144committed, it also must allow for reasonable mistakes by that person. Accordingly, the Court held that the probable
cause standard is
"correlative to [the evidence that] must be proved.' ' 15
Though it was clear from Brinegar that an assessment of probable
cause varied with the facts of the case, 4' a question remained as to how
much evidence was required to make an adequate probable cause determination. 147 The Court addressed this issue in Gerstein v. Pugh,'48 when it
held that a probable cause determination for detaining an individual,
pending further proceedings, required a different and more informal application of probable cause then what was required for a full preliminary
hearing.49 In Gerstein, the plaintiffs brought a class action suit on behalf
of prisoners in Florida whom the state had detained without an initial

138. See, e.g., Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888) (comparing extradition
requirements to those needed for a domestic preliminary hearing).
139. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing the courts' inability to specifically define probable cause).
140. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
141. See id. at 175-77 (noting that the probable cause requirement seeks, on the one
hand, "to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and
from unfounded charges of crime" and, on the other hand, "to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection").
142. See id. at 163.
143. See id. at 175-76.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 175.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 174. Although the Court acknowledged that the evidence required to
establish probable cause must be more than mere suspicion, and less than what is required
to prove guilt, it did not specify what level was required. See id.
148. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
149. See id. at 119-20 (finding adversary safeguards of a full hearing unnecessary).
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pretrial hearing to determine probable cause for their detention.5 The
Court distinguished this informal hearing-to determine probable cause
shortly following arrest-from a preliminary adversarial hearing.15 1 Justice Powell noted that, given the urgent nature of the initial hearing, it is
more difficult to present the necessary evidence and defenses required
for a full preliminary hearing."2 Moreover, requiring such safeguards
would be burdensome on an already overwhelmed criminal justice sys"'
tem. 53
The Court concluded that a magistrate may hold an informal
hearing immediately after arrest, as long as he makes a determination of
probable cause."' The Court also confirmed that an initial hearing to determine probable cause promptly after arrest requires a lower standard
of proof than is necessary at a preliminary hearing.'
The findings of Brinegar and Gerstein illustrate important principles
concerning probable cause to arrest. These principles include the nature
of probable cause to arrest, the timing, formality, and scope of the initial
detention hearing,"' and the importance of weighing the interests of all
of those involved including the detainee, the law enforcement officers,

150. See id. at 105-07.
151. See id. at 119-20.
152. See id. at 120. Gerstein,while addressing the immediacy of such a hearing, did not
define "promptly after arrest." Id. at 125. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). Writing for the majority, Justice
O'Connor determined that, based on Gerstein and other cases, "immediacy" meant that
within 48 hours of arrest a detainee was entitled to a hearing to determine probable cause
of his arrest before an independent magistrate. See id. at 58-59.
153. See Gerstein,420 U.S. at 122 n.23 ("A constitutional doctrine requiring adversary
hearings for all persons detained pending trial could exacerbate the problem of pretrial
delay.").
154. See id. at 120-21 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-75 (1949)).
Thus, the Court noted that determinations of probable cause at this stage could be based
on hearsay and written testimony. See id.
155. See id. at 120. The Court equated this standard of probable cause to detain
pending further hearings with the standard of probable cause to arrest. See id. at 120 &
n.21; see also supra note 7 (defining probable cause for arrest). For a further discussion of
the lower standard of probable cause required for a pretrial hearing, see PHILIP E.
JOHNSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 698-99 (2d ed. 1994) (observing that a lower standard of proof for probable cause indicates that "the Constitution
does little to protect a defendant from having to stand trial on weakly supported charges..
• [and] does little to guarantee defendants a right to remain at liberty before conviction");
see also In re Walters, 543 P.2d 607, 614-16 (Cal. 1975) (discussing California pretrial procedures and holding that a judicial determination of probable cause is required in order
for a defendant to be detained prior to trial); State v. Fields, 400 A.2d 1175, 1177-78 (N.H.
1979) (discussing informality of detention hearings as to probable cause, especially relating
to ex parte hearings).
156. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119-21.
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and the public at large.157 These principles have important implications in
determining a proper standard for probable cause at the provisional arrest stage of extradition.
Translating the domestic standards for probable cause into the standards required for provisional arrest and extradition seems deceptively
easy. Unfortunately, to do so would overlook the nature of the relationship between provisional arrest and extradition hearings.'
While the
standard of proof for a domestic initial arrest hearing is clearly lower
than that required for a domestic preliminary hearing," 5 it remains debatable what level of evidence' 6° should suffice for a provisional arrest
6
hearing versus an extradition
S 161 hearing.1 ' Although Congress has not directly addressed this issue, the federal courts have played a significant
6
role in establishing the nature of probable cause in extradition. 1
B. The ProbableCause Application in Extradition
Before provisional arrest existed, 64 federal courts were forced to develop a probable cause standard for extradition. 165 In so doing, courts not
only had to take into account the relevant statutes and treaties, they also
had to consider the nature of the extradition hearing and compare it to
similar domestic proceedings.'6 These early efforts resulted in principles
157. See Brinegar,338 U.S. at 175-77 (indicating some of the important interests that
must be considered in the determination of the probable cause).
158. See supra notes 49-52, 59-68, 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing some of the
differences between the provisional arrest and extradition processes).
159. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120.
160. See Brinegar,338 U.S. at 175 ("The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to
what must be proved.").
161. See Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 770 (9th Cir. 1997) (considering the
issue of the constitutionality of the standard of proof required for provisional arrest which,
until then, was undecided), op. withdrawn en banc, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998).
162. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-90 (1994) (lacking any reference to the evidentiary standard for provisional arrest or extradition).
163. See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316 (1922) (determining the proper function of
the moistrate in determining probable cause for extradition purposes); United States v.
Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding a sworn complaint issued by Spain to be
sufficient to issue provisional arrest warrant); Greci v. Birknes, 527 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir.
1976) (discussing evidentiary standards required for extradition of a fugitive to Italy).
164. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting that the development of provisional arrest in the United States did not occur until the 1960s).
165. See Collins, 259 U.S. at 316 ("The function of the committing magistrate is to determine whether there is competent evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial
[i.e., to determine whether there is probable cause], and not to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction.").
166. See Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888) (comparing extradition hearing
to preliminary hearings in the United States).
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about extradition hearings, including both the informal nature of extradition hearings'67 and the deference given to foreign courts and the extradition treaties themselves,"' a principle otherwise known as the rule of judicial non-inquiry.9
170
In Benson v. McMahon, the Supreme Court drew significant parallels
between probable cause as understood in the domestic and extradition
contexts.' 71 The Court explored the sufficiency of the evidence provided
Exto a U.S. magistrate at a Mexican fugitive's extradition hearing.'
statute173
amining the Mexican documents at issue in the context of the
174
and the existing U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty, the Court concluded
• • 17 1
Inthat the nature of the extradition hearing was unlike that of a trial.
stead, the hearing had the character of a domestic preliminary hearing. 76
was
The burden on the government to justify detaining the fugitive
guilt. 77
therefore less than that required to establish the fugitive's
167. See Yordi v. Nolte, 215 U.S. 227, 230-31 (1909) (addressing the informal process
and documents required in extradition proceedings).
168. See Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 184 (1902) (discussing the judicial deference given
foreign documents and U.S. extradition treaties in the extradition process).
169. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the role of judicial noninquiry).
170. 127 U.S. 457 (1888).
171. See id. at 463.
172. See id. at 461-62. The basis for appeal was a writ of habeas corpus applied for by
the defendant before the then Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York. See
id. at 458. A writ is also applied for on appeal from an international extradition hearing.
See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 737.
173. In this case, the court refers to "Section 5270," which reads almost verbatim to 18
U.S.C. § 3184 (1994). See Benson, 127 U.S. at 460.
174. See Treaty of Extradition, Dec. 11, 1861, U.S.-Mex., 12 Stat. 1199.
175. See Benson, 127 U.S. at 463.
[W]e are of opinion that the proceeding... is not to be regarded as in the nature
of a final trial by which the prisoner could be convicted or acquitted of the crime
charged against him, but rather of the character of those preliminary examinations which take place every day in this country ... [in order to] justify the holding of the accused ....
Id.
176. See id.; see also Rosoff, supra note 89, at 128 (discussing the Court's comparison
between an extradition proceeding and a domestic preliminary hearing and the use in both
hearings of the same standard of probable cause).
177. See Benson, 127 U.S. at 463. Another Supreme Court case that recognized the
informal nature of an extradition hearing is Yordi v. Nolte. 215 U.S. 227 (1909). In Yordi,
Chief Justice Fuller acknowledged that, especially in cases where there is a high risk that a
fugitive may flee, a fugitive may be detained and extradited upon a complaint based only
upon "information and belief" of the counsel representing the extraditing country. See id.
at 230-31. The Court noted, however, that an indictment or depositions must accompany
this informal basis for establishing probable cause in extradition, in accord with the applicable treaty. See id. at 231-32 (citing Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1901)). Thus, in
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The Court again focused on the informal nature of extradition hearings
in Grin v. Shine.7 1 In Grin, the Court also addressed the respect afforded
to the judicial systems of other countries. 179 Justice Brown's opinion
made a number of key points supporting the extradition of the defendant
to Russia. 8 ° First, the opinion acknowledged the importance of balancing the interests and rights of the detainee with the obligations owed to
other countries under U.S. extradition treaties.
Second, as for respecting foreign criminal law, the Court recognized the distinction between the U.S. and foreign charging documents, yet adhered to the notion that the documents were essentially the same in character, in
accordance with the rule of judicial non-inquiry. 2 Moreover, the Court
was satisfied that the Russian arrest warrant sufficiently complied with
the requirements of the Russo-American Extradition Treaty.
The
Court opined that, during extradition hearings conducted in good faith, a
minor procedural violation by one of the parties to the treaty should not84
interfere with the overall fulfillment of their obligations to each other.'
Finally, the Court concluded that Congress implicitly allowed such informal modes of proof at an extradition hearing through its wording of
the extradition statute.
These cases illustrate several important factors that guided courts in
extradition cases prior to the creation of provisional arrest: an informal

this type of hearing, especially where a sense of urgency is created based on the flight risk
of the fugitive, informal procedures are permitted. See id. at 230-31; United States ex rel.
McNamara v. Henkel, 46 F.2d 84, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1912) (concluding that in this time of "easy
communication and rapid travel," arrest and detention of a fugitive in anticipation of extradition and based on a telegraphic request is reasonable as long as officials act properly).
178. 187 U.S. 181,185, 191-92 (1902).
179. See id. at 184-85.
180. See id. at 183-85, 190-92. The defendant, a Russian national, was wanted in Russia for embezzlement and had fled that country for San Francisco. See id. at 183.
181. See id. at 184. The Court stated that "[t]hese treaties should be faithfully observed... without sacrificing the legal or constitutional rights of the accused." Id.
182. See id. at 190-91. Reinforcing this point, the Court said that it did not expect that
judges should be conversant in foreign criminal law; rather, it expected them to respect
authorized documents from foreign courts. See id. This conclusion was consistent with a
Supreme Court case decided the previous year that confirmed the rule of judicial noninquiry. See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1901) (providing the foundation for
the development of the rule); see also supra note 36 (discussing the rule of judicial noninquiry).
183. See Grin, 187 U.S. at 191 (referring to the Treaty of Extradition, March 16-28,
1887, U.S.-Russia, 28 Stat. 1071 (proclaimed on June 5, 1893)).
184. See id. at 185.
185. See id. at 191 (stating that Congress may "declare that foreign criminals shall be
surrendered upon such [informal] proofs of criminality as it may judge sufficient").

1998]

Gauging an Adequate ProbableCause Standard

in cases
hearings," especially
atmosphere117that governs most extradition
•
•18
of urgency, and a recognition and respect of foreign criminal laws.'
C. The Probable Cause Application in ProvisionalArrest: Pre-Parretti
The development of provisional arrest provisions in extradition treaties starting in the late 1960s signaled a new era in U.S. extradition law."'
Federal courts moved slowly and incrementally through these uncharted
waters and until recently had not reached the constitutionality of such
provisions or the statute governing them.' Using the case law dealing
with extradition, the courts were able to fashion inferences as to provisional arrest.'91 Moreover, the rise in awareness of human rights, especially since the mid-1970s, affected many of the decisions revolving
around the provisional arrest and detention of international fugitives.' 92
Despite these developments, by the late 1980s, a split among the circuits
had emerged as to the requirements necessary to establish probable
cause for a provisional arrest. 93 As of yet, the U.S. Supreme Court has
not addressed this probable cause standard.' 94
One of the first cases to address provisional arrest, United States v.
Williams,'9' examined the nature of the interests involved in a fugitive's
186. See Grin, 187 U.S. at 185; Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888); supra
notes 175-77 (discussing the informal nature of extradition hearings).
187. See Yordi v. Nolte, 215 U.S. 227, 230-31 (1909).
188. See Grin, 187 U.S. at 184, 190-91; supra notes 181-184 and accompanying text (indicating the deference to be given to foreign legal systems and their laws).
189. The cases discussed infra are the first to address provisional arrest and its constitutionality.
190. See Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 773 (9th Cir. 1997) (resolving the constitutionality of the provisions), op. withdrawn en banc, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998); see
also Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 748 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting the court's reluctance to
resolve the constitutional issue); infra text accompanying note 193 (indicating the lack of
consensus about the proper standard of probable cause required for provisional arrest).
191. See In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1216 (5th Cir. 1986) (approving, in
a provisional arrest, a district court's adoption and use of a standard of review normally
used for extradition).
192. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of human
rights and other factors on the decision of whether to extradite); see also United States v.
Williams, 480 F. Supp. 482, 485 (D. Mass. 1979) (noting the judge's concern about a thirtyday detention under provisional arrest without a proper showing of probable cause), rev'd
on other grounds, 611 F.2d 914 (1st Cir. 1979).
193. Compare Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that the
evidentiary standard required for probable cause did not differ between the provisional
arrest and extradition hearings), with Russell, 805 F.2d at 1217 (holding that evidence for
probable cause for provisional arrest should be informal).

194. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 686.
195.

480 F. Supp. 482 (D. Mass. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 914 (1st Cir.
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detention under a provisional arrest warrant.' 96 In Williams, the defendant had been arrested and detained in the United States based on a
telegraphic request from Canada.' 9' The defendant questioned his detention because the Canadian arrest warrant was the only basis of the request. 198 Moreover, the government failed to establish any reasonable
grounds other than the warrant to merit his detention, which was without
bail, for up to forty-five days.' 9 Although District Court Judge Keeton
held that this case was appropriate to allow bail 2 °-which was later reversed-he did raise questions as to the procedures that allowed such detention without an adequate showing of probable cause under the Fourth
Amendment.2 0 ' He further questioned the government's position that
treaty obligations outweighed an 20intrusion
of personal liberty in this
3
case. 202 In his opinion, they did not.

In United States v. Wiebe, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
implicitly addressed Judge Keeton's concerns in Williams regarding the
lengthy detention of an individual under provisional arrest.2°1 In Wiebe,
the defendant questioned whether the applicable U.S.-Spain extradition
treaty 2° governing his provisional arrest and detention met the require-

ment for a showing of probable cause under the Constitution. 2°7 The
court. affirmed Wiebe's extradition after making two important points.2 8
1979).
196. See id. at 485.
197. See id. at 483. Williams was wanted in Canada for conspiracy to import narcotics.
See id.
198. See id. at 485.
199. See id. at 485 & n.1.
200. See id. at 487.
201. See id. at 485.
202. See id. In this case, the United States argued that, absent "special circumstances,"
the court was under a statutory mandate not to override U.S. treaty relations. See id. The
court found that "special circumstances" did override the treaty concerns and released
Williams on bail. See id. at 487-88.
203. See id. at 486-88 (holding that allowing Williams free on bail outweighed the government's treaty obligations).
204. 733 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1984).
205. See id. at 554. Although the Eighth Circuit did not address Judge Keeton's concerns in Williams directly, the court did discuss the reasons for the length of detention under provisional arrest. See id. (citing United States v. Clark, 470 F. Supp. 976, 979 (D. Vt.
1979)).
206. See id. at 551 (referring to the Treaty on Extradition between the United States
and Spain, May 29, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 737, as supplemented, Jan. 25, 1975, 29 U.S.T. 2283).
207. See Wiebe, 733 F.2d at 552. Although the U.S.-Spain extradition treaty allowed a
person to be detained under a provisional arrest for no more than 45 days, Wiebe was held
longer due to a clerical error in the exchange of the extradition documents between the
two countries. See id. at 551.
208. See id. at 554.
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First, the court held that a provisional arrest warrant may be issued upon
two grounds.2°9 In a sworn complaint, there must be a showing by the
government that an extradition treaty exists between the two countries
and a showing that the fugitive committed one of the crimes set forth in
that treaty. 21° Because the government in this case met this burden, the
211
court held that the arrest warrant was issued properly.
Second, the
court addressed the Williams court's concerns about the length of detention under provisional arrest.212 The court indicated that "bureaucratic
sluggishness" in preparing and transmitting the required documents was
the primary reason for the length of the detention."3 By raising this point
and emphasizing the pragmatic distinctions between international and
domestic arrests, the Wiebe court clearly differentiated the need for a
long detention period under provisional arrest compared to the relatively
short one allowed in domestic preliminary hearings.
While Williams and Wiebe merely probed the legality of the detention
of an individual without an adequate showing of probable cause,215 the
case of Caltagironev. Gran?" was the first to address directly the issue of
probable cause under a provisional arrest."' In Caltagirone, the defen-

dant argued that his provisional arrest was not based on sufficient probable cause because the government supported its warrant only by noting
the existence of Italian arrest warrants for the defendant.
209. See id. at 553-54.
210. See id. The meaning of the court's opinion has been interpreted very differently.
Compare Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 772 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining the U.S.
government's position to be that Wiebe allowed for a provisional arrest warrant to be
based on the existence of a foreign arrest warrant), op. withdrawn, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir.
1998) and Appellee's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 12,
Parretti,122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-56586) (same), with Parretti,122 F.3d at 772
(differing with the government's interpretation, stating that the Eighth Circuit required a
full showing of probable cause for provisional arrest).
211. See Wiebe, 733 F.2d at 554.
212. See id.
213. See id. (citing United States v. Clark, 470 F. Supp. 976, 979 (D. Vt. 1979)).
214. Compare Wiebe, 733 F.2d at 554 (discussing justification for the 45-day detention
under provisional arrest), with County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57
(1991) (discussing reasons for the 48-hour detention under warrantless arrest in domestic
criminal law).
215. See Wiebe, 733 F.2d at 554; United States v. Williams, 480 F. Supp. 482, 485 (D.
Mass. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 914 (1st Cir. 1979).
216. 629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980).
217. See id. at 747.
218. See id. at 743. The United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York
submitted to a local magistrate a sworn complaint that alleged that there were outstanding
Italian arrest warrants for the defendant. See id. at 743. Based on that information, the
magistrate issued a warrant for Caltagirone's arrest in New York. See id.
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Reversing the district court's affirmation of the issuance of the arrest
warranty 9 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the
defendant, concluding that probable cause had not been sufficiently established under the 1973 U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty. ° The court said
that, while deference must be paid to foreign judicial determinations, the
request for provisional arrest must comply with the treaty requirements."' The Second Circuit found that the U.S. Attorney failed to show
probable cause for the provisional arrest as the treaty required, and concluded that the district court should not have upheld the arrest warrant.222
The court in Caltagirone made several significant points about probable cause and provisional arrest. First, the court indicated that, because
the language of the treaty prohibited the detention of a fugitive without a
finding of probable cause, the constitutionality of treaties that permit arrests absent such a finding was not to be addressed in this case. 3 Second, while the court acknowledged that deference to foreign judgments
is normally proper, it also said that it is within the court's jurisdiction to
review whether a treaty's obligations were met.224 In Caltagirone,they

219. See id. at 750. District court Judge Cannella stated that he was not in the position
to "second-guess" the magistrate's decision, especially because there was no issue as to the
validity of the Italian arrest warrants. See id. at 743.
220. See id. at 745 (referring to Treaty of Extradition, Jan. 18, 1973, United StatesItaly, 26 U.S.T. 493 [hereinafter 1973 U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty]).
221. See id. at 744. At the time, Article XIII of the 1973 U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty
required that the provisional arrest request be supplemented with detailed information
about the fugitive and "such further information, if any" that would justify his arrest. See
1973 U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, supra note 220, 26 U.S.T. at 502. The Second Circuit
read this phrase as a basis for a requirement of probable cause. See Caltagirone,629 F.2d
at 744.
A new treaty subsequently superseded the 1973 U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty. See 1983
U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, supra note 116, 35 U.S.T. 3023. The new language in this
treaty is substantially different from the 1973 Treaty especially as to provisional arrest requests. See id. at art. XII, 35 U.S.T. at 3034. The Italian Constitutional Court declared the
1984 Treaty unconstitutional in 1996 because it permitted extradition for crimes that allowed for the death penalty which is forbidden by the Italian Constitution. See
BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 676 n.113; see also Mark E. DeWitt, Comment, Extradition
Enigma: Italy and Human Rights vs. America and the Death Penalty, 47 CATH. U. L. REV.
535, 542-43 (1998).
222. See Caltagirone,629 F.2d at 748.
223. See id. at 747. The Second Circuit also distinguished between extradition treaties
that require "such further information" and those that do not. See id. at 746. The court
did not delve into those treaties that lacked such a requirement. See id. This issue on the
constitutionality of such non-specific treaties would finally be addressed in Parretti v.
United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997), op. withdrawn en banc, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir.
1998).
224. See Caltagirone,629 F.2d at 744.
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were not."' Third, the court attempted to clarify the differences between
extradition and provisional arrest proceedings within the scope of the
treaty. 226 The court determined, however, that while the requirement for
221
probable cause did not differ between the two processes, the sufficiency of the evidence required to show probable cause may vary. 22s Finally, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the principle that, when construing a
statute or a treaty, the Constitution always will govern.229
In In re Extradition of Russell, 30 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit echoed the Second Circuit's reasoning in Caltagirone by reaffirming the two important criteria for provisional arrest, probable cause
and urgency. 3 ' As to probable cause for provisional arrest, the court
confirmed the informality of the information required to make such a determination. 232 As to the urgency requirement, the court defined its im-

225. See id. at 745. The court failed to find that "such further information" was provided by the Italians beyond a copy of the arrest warrant. See id.; cf. Sahagian v. United
States, 864 F.2d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding constitutionality of the U.S.-Spain Extradition Treaty requiring "such further information" for provisional arrest and finding
that the government met this burden).
226. See Caltagirone,629 F.2d at 747. The court clarified three major differences between the two proceedings, based on the treaty. See id. First, the provisional arrest provision required "information," implying a lower standard than that of the extradition provision which required "evidence." See id. Given the urgency factor required by most
provisional arrest provisions, the "information" was allowed to be informal in character, as
opposed to substance. See id. Extradition's evidentiary requirement imparted more formality, requiring certified depositions, arrest warrants, and the like. See id. Second, the
provisional arrest request, according to the treaty, could be made directly between the Justice ministries, as compared to requests for extradition, which must be made through
"diplomatic channels." See id. Finally, the court noted that the treaty requires clear evidence for extradition, rather than mere allegations contained in an indictment relating to
the identity of the fugitive, in addition to details and the law defining the crimes alleged,
and other such relevant documents. See id. Such "proof" and additional information are
not required for provisional arrest by the treaty. See id.
227. See id. ("The Treaty's draftsmen clearly intended to streamline the [provisional
arrest] procedure in urgent cases, but not by sacrificing the protection of the probable
cause requirement.").
228. See id. ("We do not find., that our construction of the Treaty will undercut [the
provisional arrest provision's] purpose to provide a more streamlined mechanism for accommodating applications from foreign nations than full-blown extradition proceedings
now require.").
229. See id. at 741.
230. 805 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1986).
231. See id. at 1217-18.
232. See id. at 1217 (citing Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 1980), and
Yordi v. Nolte, 215 U.S. 227, 232 (1909)); see also United States ex rel. Petrushansky v.
Marasco, 325 F.2d 562, 564 (2d Cir. 1963) (indicating that the AUSA's complaint was sufficient based only on his information and belief for a provisional arrest hearing; his lack of
knowledge of the case's facts were "irrelevant").
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portance as a component of provisional arrest. 3 The factors to consider
in order to detain a fugitive quickly include his/her flight risk, the perceived threat to the public, and the government's interest in maintaining
good relations with countries with whom the United States has extradition treaties.2
Although it is clear that there was some agreement among the courts
as to the urgent and informal nature of provisional arrest,235 there remained a subtle difference of opinion as to the proper application of
probable cause in provisional arrest.236 As of early 1997, no court had
specifically addressed the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3184 or extradition treaty provisions for provisional arrest that did not contain a "further information" clause. 37 This issue was finally addressed in Parrettiv.
United States,"' though the withdrawal of this opinion has obfuscated the
point. 9
IV. PARRETTI: AN INADEQUATE PROBABLE CAUSE SHOWING

A. Background: Cashingin on the Constitution
Giancarlo Parretti's extradition troubles began in 1990 when he completed a highly leveraged purchase of MGM-United Artists240-a purchase that spawned a number of lawsuits both in France and the United
States.2 ' In October 1995, while in Los Angeles giving a deposition for
233. See id. at 1218 (citing United States v. Leitner, 784 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1986)
and United States v. Messina, 566 F. Supp. 740, 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)).
234. See id.; see also Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 185 (1902) (noting the respect U.S.
courts should give to foreign judicial systems).
235. See Russell, 805 F.2d at 1217-18 (noting probable cause and urgency as the two
criteria for provisional arrest); Caltagirone,629 F.2d at 747 (acknowledging the informal
nature of provisional arrest hearings).
236. Compare Caltagirone,629 F.2d at 747 (noting the requirement for informal information for provisional arrest), with United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553-54 (8th
Cir. 1984) (affirming that the government's sworn complaint showing that an extradition
treaty exists and the fugitive allegedly committed a crime specifically listed in that treaty
sufficed for a provisional arrest warrant).
237. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text (describing the lack of consensus
on what constitutes a proper evidentiary standard for provisional arrest).
238. 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997), op. withdrawn en banc, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998).
239. See Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 509 (9th Cir. 1998) (refusing to
readdress the constitutional issues based on the application of the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine).
240. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 761.
241. See id. Parretti was also criminally charged in a suit arising out of the same acquisition in Delaware. See Parretti,143 F.3d at 512 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). He was later
tried and convicted of these charges in Delaware and, while awaiting sentencing for these
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one of the American suits, federal agents arrested Parretti pursuant to a

provisional arrest warrant issued by a United States Magistrate in Los
242

Angeles.
This warrant was based upon a complaint sworn to by an
AUSA, which was in turn based on a French arrest warrant charging
Parretti with numerous financial crimes.243 France had relayed this warrant to the U.S. State Department pursuant to the U.S.-France Extradi-

tion Treaty.2" The French warrant referenced numerous investigations
and information, but neither identified their sources nor offered supporting affidavits or documents.2 45 Nonetheless, the AUSA stated in the
complaint that France had issued a statement of intention to request extradition within forty days, as specified by the treaty.246
At his bail hearing, and later at his habeas corpus hearing before the
District Court for the Central District of California, Parretti argued that
the warrant issued for his arrest was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. 7 One argument he made was that the magistrate had is-

sued the provisional arrest warrant without an adequate probable cause
finding, because there was insufficient evidence within the French arrest
warrant to show that he had committed any crime.248 Second, Parretti ar-

gued that the warrant was unconstitutional because the magistrate had
249

failed to make an adequate probable cause determination.
The district court denied Parretti's petition for a writ of habeas corpus
crimes, Parretti fled the country. See id.
242. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 761.
243. See id.
244. See id.; see also U.S.-France Extradition Treaty, supra note 12, art. IV, 37 Stat.
1526, 1529-30 (outlining procedures for provisional arrest). For the text of Article IV of
the Treaty, see supra note 110.
245. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 773-74.
246. See id. at 761 n.2; see also supra note 110 (reciting the text of Article IV of the
treaty).
247. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 761.
248. See id. at 761-62.
249. See id. at 762. Parretti particularly noted that the Magistrate had acknowledged
that the information in support of the arrest warrant may not be enough to support a
probable cause determination at the extradition hearing, but nonetheless issued the warrant. See id.
In response to these arguments, the government asserted that, despite the informality of
the complaint for provisional arrest, the information sent by the French was sufficient to
meet a probable cause standard. See id. Second, the government argued that the Magistrate made a proper probable cause determination because a provisional arrest warrant
may be issued on a sole showing that the fugitive had been charged with a crime, as opposed to having committed it. See id. Finally, the government argued that since the Secretary of State had determined implicitly through the decision to enforce the extradition
treaty that France's criminal charging procedures were reliable, the Court must defer to
such determinations under the rule of judicial non-inquiry and accept the French warrant
at face value. See id. at 762-63; see also supra note 36 (discussing judicial non-inquiry).
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because it found that the government's complaint was based on sufficient
facts to establish probable cause."' 0 Further, in response to Parretti's
claim that the government had failed to make a full showing of probable
cause, the district court said that the purpose of the provisional arrest
was to allow forty days for the government to gather the proper amount
of evidence to make such a showing.251 Based on this conclusion, the
court did not address the government's arguments regarding the necessary probable cause standard for provisional arrest, nor did it address the
issue of judicial non-inquiry. 2
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reviewed the decision and ordered the release of Parretti. 253 The panel gave two independent grounds
for its decision: Parretti's arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because
the district court failed to make a determination of probable cause; and
Parretti's detention without bail violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.114 The court made its determination by refusing to
apply the rule of judicial non-inquiry in this case and by finding that the
government failed to show probable cause.255
B. The Ninth Circuit on ProvisionalArrest and ProbableCause
The Ninth Circuit panel specifically addressed three issues surrounding
provisional arrest and the Fourth Amendment: the role of the rule of judicial non-inquiry, the constitutionality of the statute and treaty governing Parretti's extradition absent a probable cause standard, and the
proper showing of probable cause for a provisional arrest hearing. 256
First, the court disagreed with the government's argument that the rule
of judicial non-inquiry should apply to foreign warrants, which would
preclude an independent judicial determination of probable cause."' The
court reasoned that it has an "obligation" to decide justiciable controver-

250. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 762-63.
251. See id. at 762. For text of judge's comments, see supra note 29.
252. See id. at 762-63. The district court also denied Parretti's bail application, even
though it did not find him to be a flight risk. See id. at 763.
253. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 760, 763.
254. See id. at 763-64. The court's finding on the Fifth Amendment issue is beyond the
scope of this Note. For a discussion of the Fifth Amendment's application to extradition,
see generally BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 692-98 (discussing the issue of bail as it relates to
extradition proceedings).
255. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 764-67, 773-76.
256. See id. at 764-76 (Norris, J., plurality opinion) (discussing probable cause).
257. See id. at 765, 767 (declining to extend the rule of judicial non-inquiry to Fourth
Amendment probable cause determinations for provisional arrest warrants).
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sies."' The court distinguished between fact-specific issues, where the
rule may be invoked, and "policy-like determinations," where the rule is
not invoked."9 Here, the case required judicial involvement, because a
factual question existed as to whether Parretti had committed a crime. 6 °
Also, the court rejected the government's argument-that it should respect judicial non-inquiry by deferring to foreign judicial decisions much
as courts do in domestic interstate extradition under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. 26' The court observed that, unlike domestic warrants, foreign warrants do not carry a presumption of constitutionality.262
The second and most critical issue that the court addressed was
whether a provisional arrest warrant may be issued without a full showing of probable cause under the Fourth Amendment."' This issue was
one of first impression for the court.2 64 To determine the proper application of probable cause in provisional arrest, the court looked to the
sources of provisional arrest-namely § 3184 and the French treaty-and
the purpose of the warrant. 261
As to the treaty, the court distinguished this case from Caltagirone v.
Grant 6 by emphasizing that the Second Circuit had interpreted the language of the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty as requiring a showing of
probable cause for provisional arrest. 67 The French treaty in this case,
however, did not contain such language in either the provisional arrest
article' 6' or Article I of the treaty,"' which governed extradition in general.270

258. See id. at 765-66.
259. Id. The court examined the application of the rule in the context of opinions
dealing with the political offense exception. See id. at 766.
260. See id. at 767.
261. See id. at 766-67 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, and Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S.
282 (1978), as the basis for the government's argument).
262. See id. at 767 ("Because foreign governments are not bound by the Constitution,
we decline to invoke the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution to clothe foreign
arrest warrants with a presumption of compliance with the Fourth Amendment.").
263. See id. at 767-73.
264. See id. at 767-68. In fact, no federal appellate court had addressed the issue. See
id.
265. See id. at 769-71.
266. 629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980).
267. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 768 (citing Caltagirone,629 F.2d at 742, 747). The court
also noted a similar interpretation of the U.S.-Spain Extradition Treaty in Sahagian v.
United States, 864 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1988). See Parretti,122 F.3d at 768-69.
268. See U.S.-France Extradition Treaty, supra note 12, art. IV, 37 Stat. at 1529-30.
269. See U.S.-France Extradition Treaty, supra note 12, art. I, 37 Stat. at 1527, as
amended, 22 U.S.T. 408,408-09.
270. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 769; supra note 110 (stating the French Treaty provision
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The court then attempted to find a probable cause requirement in the
language of § 3184.271 The court declined to find in § 3184 a requirement
of probable cause for provisional arrest after it determined that the statute required only a complaint charging that the fugitive committed an extraditable crime. 2

The court also considered whether, as the government argued, the
provisional arrest warrant's limited purpose also limited the evidentiary
standard required for probable cause.2 73 The court stated that the War-

rant Clause of the Fourth Amendment2 74 did not allow for a varying standa d of probable cause. 27' According to the court, an individual's
right to
276
freedom from government restraint was "immutable.,
After concluding that the probable cause standard for provisional arrest was the same as that required for extradition, the court declared the
provisional arrest provision of the U.S.-France Extradition Treaty2 77 and
§ 3184 facially unconstitutional.1 The court found that both the statute
and the treaty failed to address that standard.279
The final issue that the panel addressed was whether the government
had made an adequate showing of probable cause in light of the "new"
standard. 2' ° The court rejected the government's argument that the
French magistrate's arrest warrant should not be questioned."' The
panel stated that such deference was improper in this case282 and instead
relevant to provisional arrest). The court, examining Article I of the treaty, concluded
that because it could not find the express requirement within the treaty for such a requirement, no probable cause requirement existed. See Parretti, 122 F.3d at 769. Although such a requirement was not explicit in the treaty, the court's opinion did not draw
any inferences that such a requirement existed. See id.
271. See id. at 769-70.
272. See id. at 770. As it did when examining the U.S.-France Extradition Treaty, the
court in Parrettifailed to find an express requirement for a probable cause determination
in United States law. See id. The court, using a strict construction of the statute, failed to
draw any inferences that a probable cause determination was required for issuance of a
provisional arrest warrant. See id.; cf Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6, 17 (1957) (requiring
the United States government to comply with the Constitution when exercising its power
under an international agreement and when acting against a U.S. citizen even when he is
abroad).
273. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 771.
274. See supra note 5 (containing the text of the Fourth Amendment).
275. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 771.
276. See id.
277. See supra note 110, art. IV, 37 Stat. at 1529-30 (stating the text of the provision).
278. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 773.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 773-76.
281. See id. at 774.
282. The court indicated that the government's complaint, supported only by an un-
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focused on whether the government had made a satisfactory probable
cause determination.23 The court held that the foreign arrest warrant
alone was insufficient to satisfy the required standard, especially because
no other documents were attached to support it.84 Although the court
did not fully define the information needed to meet a probable cause
standard for provisional arrest, it indicated that besides just a warrant,
necessary. 2 8 5
depositions, affidavits, and other similar documents were
Based on its conclusions, the panel reversed the decision of the district
286
court on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds.
substantiated French arrest warrant, was insufficient to merit a finding of probable cause.
See id. at 774-75. This finding must be distinguished from whether the French arrest warrant itself met the standards of probable cause. For a discussion of the French standard of
proof, see infra note 325 and accompanying text.
283. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 774. This section of the opinion represented the amendment to the panel's original decision, made in August, 1997. The initial opinion simply
discussed the insufficiency of the AUSA's complaint based on information from "unidentified" French officials. See Parretti v. United States, 112 F.3d 1363, 1378 (9th Cir.),
amended and superceded by 122 F.3d 758, 774 (9th Cir. 1997). The amended section, however, included the panel's counterargument to the government's assertion that Congress
intended § 3184 to render an extradition treaty partner's statement of charges as enough
to per se satisfy probable cause to arrest the fugitive. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 774. The
court indicated that it is for the courts, not Congress, to decide when the probable cause
requirement is met. See id.
284. See id. at 775. The court, however, did not completely address whether a foreign
arrest warrant with substantiated charges within it would suffice to satisfy probable cause.
See id. Examining Yordi v. Nolte, 215 U.S. 227 (1909) and In re Extraditionof Russell, 805
F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1986), the court hinted that other documents were necessary to support
probable cause, including depositions, and other such evidence. See Parretti,122 F.3d at
775.
285. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 775.
286. See id. at 781. The court held that Parretti's detention without bail violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, even though Parretti failed to meet the requirement for "special circumstances" that would permit him to receive bail. See id. at
780-81.
In his concurrence with Judge Norris, Judge Reinhardt agreed completely with the
Fourth Amendment analysis and to a large extent with the Fifth Amendment analysis. See
Parretti,122 F.3d at 781-87 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). He noted that the Supreme Court
never adopted the "special circumstances" test used by courts in extradition bail hearings,
and argued that that test should not be used at all. See id. at 782-83, 786 (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring).
Judge Pregerson dissented, stating that because Parretti had fled the country following
his release on bail, the case should be dismissed under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine
because his absence threatens the functioning of the adversary process. See id. at 787
(Pregerson, J., dissenting); see also supra note 40 (discussing Judge Pregerson's dissent in
the panel decision and his subsequent majority opinion in the en banc appellate decision).
Before the panel's opinion was released, the French authorities continued the extradition process for Parretti. See id. at 764 n.6. The government filed a formal request for extradition in November of 1995, and Parretti was certified to be extradited at his hearing.
See id. Further certifying that Parretti was not a flight risk, the new magistrate allowed
Parretti out on bail, pending the filing of a new petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See id.
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C. Withdrawalof the Panel's Opinion:A FrustratingDecision
Almost a year after the panel issued its initial opinion, the Ninth Circuit, meeting en banc, withdrew both the panel and the amended decisions pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.27 As Judge Reinhardt noted, this decision "frustrate[s]" the court's ability to address the
important constitutional issues that Parrettiraised.2 Setting aside the
contentious question of whether the disentitlement doctrine was applied
appropriately, 9 the en banc opinion has left the panel's decision technically ineffective.2 " The conclusions made in the panel's decision, however, remain influential. Given the rarity of cases where the constitutionality of provisional arrest is addressed,291 should a similar case arise in
the future, a court would have to readdress the weighty questions that
were left unanswered by the withdrawal of the panel's decision in Parretti. That court could look to the panel's reasoning for guidance on resolving these issues. Given this possible persuasive effect of the panel's
opinion, addressing its reasoning and conclusions now is critically important in order to avoid the reemergence of the potential crisis the Parretti
decision presented.2

Parretti filed a new petition in July 1996, see id., then fled the country in January 1997. See
id. at 787 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). That appeal was later dismissed by the district court
under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. See id. at 764 n.6; supra note 40 (discussing the
disentitlement doctrine).
In the interim, the government appealed the panel's decision to the Ninth Circuit en
banc. See Appellee's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing en banc, Parretti (No. 95-56586); see also Appellee's Supplemental Brief, Parretti(No. 95-56586). On
December 18, 1997, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, en banc, heard arguments
on the appeal. See Wiehl, supra note 39. On May 1, 1998, the court issued an opinion that
dismissed the appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and withdrew the panel's
opinion. See Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 509 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
287. See Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 511 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). For further discussion of this opinion and the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, see supra notes 40
& 41.
288. Id. at 513 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
289. Compare id. at 509-11 (applying the doctrine and withdrawing the panel's opinion), with id. at 511-13 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (arguing that the doctrine did not apply
because the fugitive had fled after receiving the remedy he sought and the government
was pursuing an appeal of the panel's decision, not the fugitive); see also supra note 40
(discussing the debate over the applicability of the doctrine).
290. See supra note 41 (discussing 9TH CIR. R. 35-3).
291. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting the infrequency of cases concerning the constitutionality of provisional arrest).
292. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43 (indicating the potential heavy burdens
that faced the United States and other international law enforcement officials had Parretti
maintained its effect).
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V. ROUGHING THE WATERS: THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF PARRETTI

The potential ramifications of the panel's decision in Parretti are dramatic. Despite the withdrawal of the panel's opinion, 18 U.S.C. § 3184
and the extradition treaties could again face close scrutiny by the courts
should a similar case emerge. Congress may have to act by rewriting the
150-year old statute193 and the United States may have to renegotiate
many of its extradition treaties, a time-consuming and burdensome effort. 94 Furthermore, the increased burden of proof that a higher probable cause standard would place on international law enforcement officials could make extradition impractical, for it would be more difficult
for such officials to arrest and detain fugitives at an early stage in the extradition process.9
Despite the potential havoc the Parrettidecision could wreak on international law enforcement, the Ninth Circuit panel made the correct decision when it required a showing of probable cause for the purposes of

293. Notwithstanding the Parretti decision, it is evident that Congress should reform
the international extradition process. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 36-44 (discussing
prior legislative attempts to amend § 3184); cf. Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65, 78
(D.D.C. 1995) (holding § 3184 unconstitutional for violating the separation of powers),
vacated on jurisdictionalgrounds, 82 F.3d 1081, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1996). A prior attempt at
reform in the early 1980s failed mainly because of a lack of will on behalf of Congress and
President Reagan. See supra note 83 (discussing the Extradition Reform Acts in the early
1980s). The current statute which has governed international extradition for almost 150
years is now showing its limits. See generally Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th
Cir. 1997) (holding § 3184 unconstitutional for not requiring probable cause for provisional arrest); Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 78 (holding § 3184 to be unconstitutional in violation
of separation of powers). Congressional reform must address these limits, particularly the
statute's failure to address either provisional arrest or the proper application of probable
cause in a decisive manner.
A proper test that Congress could use in a refashioned § 3184 would be similar to the
balancing test put forth in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), as applied in domestic arrest cases. See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-12, 120-21 (1975). The
new test for probable cause for provisional arrest must be based on probabilities and balance the interests of those involved, including the liberty interests of the detainee, the interests of the international law enforcement community in doing its job efficiently and effectively, and the interests in public safety of the world community at large. See Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (discussing some of these interests). The new
test also must reflect the difference in application of probable cause to the different stages
of extradition. See supra Parts I, II (noting some of the important differences between the
provisional arrest and extradition hearing stages of the extradition process). As in Brinegar, the probable cause standard must be "correlative" to the evidence that must be
proved. Brinegar,338 U.S. at 175.
294. Interview with Mary Jo Grotenrath, supra note 42.
295. See Appellee's Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing en banc at
17, Parretti(No. 95-56586) (describing the effect on the extradition process if the government has to establish a full evidentiary showing for provisional arrest).
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provisional arrest.296 The applicability of the Constitution in this situation is unquestionable, given the clarity of the legal precedent.29, At the
same time, however, there are several significant flaws in its reasoning.
First, a fair inference can be drawn from the case law that provisional
arrest is informal and requires a limited application of probable cause.2 98
The Second Circuit, in Caltagirone v. Grant,299 was able to show this, in
accordance with the governing extradition treaty, without altering the
requirement that probable cause was needed for both hearings.3°° In that
opinion, the court compared the nature of the evidence required under
30 1
the treaty at both the provisional arrest and extradition hearings.
Noting that, although the information required for a provisional arrest
warrant can be limited and informal, the Caltagirone opinion held that
probable cause was required for both extradition and arrest.3' 2 This
probable cause standard, however, is correlative to the evidence that
must be proved. °3 The panel in Parretti failed to make that distinction
between the two types of hearings. Caltagirone demonstrates that the
urgent and informal nature of provisional arrest can be maintained without undermining a proper showing of probable cause. 3°4
The notion that it is possible to have different evidentiary requirements for different types of hearings is buttressed by the Supreme

296. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (indicating that treaties, like statutes,
are subject to restraint by the Constitution).
297. See supra note 109 (citing cases discussing the jurisdictional reach of the Constitution).
298. See, e.g., In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1217-18 (5th Cir. 1.986) (noting the informality of information required for provisional arrest due to the urgency of the
situation); United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553-54 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting the limited
extent of evidence required under a complaint); Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 747
(2d Cir. 1980) (comparing evidentiary proof required for provisional arrest and extradition).
299. 629 F.2d at 739.
300. See id. at 747 ("Article XI and Article XIII both require a showing of probable
cause, but the proceedings they contemplate are different in several crucial respects."); see
also 1973 U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, supra note 220, arts. XI, XIII, 26 U.S.T. at 500-02.
301. See Caltagirone,629 F.2d at 747; see also supra note 226 and accompanying text
(discussing differences in evidentiary standards required for provisional arrest and extradition).
302. See Caltagirone,629 F.2d at 747 ("Though the Government persuasively suggests
that the provisional arrest and extradition proceedings must differ in some way, the difference does not lie in the requirement of probable cause.")
303. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); see also Caltagirone,629
F.2d at 747 (noting the differences between the evidentiary requirements for provisional
arrest and extradition, without sacrificing a proper finding of probable cause).
304. See Caltagirone, 629 F.2d at 747.
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Court's decision in Gerstein v. Pugh."5 In Gerstein, Justice Powell distinguished the nature of a domestic initial probable cause hearing following
arrest from a preliminary hearing, taking special notice of the implicitly
urgent and informal character of the first hearing as compared to the
more formal preliminary hearing.3° He nonetheless cautioned against
abandoning a probable cause showing at the initial hearing, stating that a
probable cause standard similar to that needed for arrest was required of
prosecutors.3 °7 By equating the scope of this initial hearing to that of the
provisional arrest hearing, 3°8 a proper inference about the character of a
provisional arrest hearing can be drawn, thereby limiting the scope of the
information required to issue a provisional arrest warrant.3° By doing so,
some of the harsh burdens on law enforcement resulting from the higher
probable cause standard advanced by the Parretti decision can be mitigated."O
A second facet of provisional arrest that was not adequately addressed
by the Parretticourt was the practical consideration of urgency.3" This
3 1 2 and United
failure ignores the holdings of In re Extradition of Russell
States v. Wiebe."' In Russell, the Fifth Circuit found urgency to be an
important criterion for provisional arrest by emphasizing the significance
of the fugitive's flight risk.314 In Wiebe, the Eighth Circuit indicated the
importance of accounting for the bureaucratic sluggishness that is associated with international extradition."' These factors are especially relevant today, given the time needed for foreign governments to gather,

305. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
306. See id. at 119-22 n.23 (noting the need for an efficient early stage of the criminal
prosecution process).
307. See id. at 120.
308. Cf. Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888) (equating the character of a
domestic preliminary hearing to that of an extradition hearing).
309. Compare Gerstein,420 U.S. at 119-20 (comparing the procedural standards for an
initial domestic probable cause hearing with those required for a full domestic preliminary
hearing), with Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 1980) (comparing evidentiary standards required for provisional arrest with those required for extradition hearings).
310. See supra note 295 and accompanying text (indicating the potential increased evidentiary burden of law enforcement for provisional arrest resulting from Parretti).
311. See Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 772-73 (9th Cir. 1997) (considering the
urgency factor but rejecting its practical relevancy), op. withdrawn en banc, 143 F.3d 508
(9th Cir. 1998).
312. 805 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1986).
313. 733 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1984).
314. See Russell, 805 F.2d at 1218.
315. See Wiebe, 733 F.2d at 554.
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translate, and transmit evidence to the United States.316 Further, as noted
by the Wiebe court, this government lethargy justifies the limited length
of time allowed for detention under provisional arrest." 7 These factors
together rebut the Parretticourt's dismissal of the urgency requirement
for provisional arrest."'
The third flaw of the Parretti opinion was the striking down of both
§ 3184, a statute that has governed international extradition for 150
years, and the U.S.-France Extradition Treaty provision on provisional
arrest.319 As to the statute, the court could have inferred that a showing
of probable cause was required for provisional arrest, similar to the inference made that probable cause applies to an extradition hearing.32 °

316. In Parretti,the necessary documents that the court would have required in order
to support the warrant effectively consisted of almost 2,000 pages of information, most of
which would have required translation from French to English. See Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 15, Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-56586).
317. See Wiebe, 733 F.2d at 554 (justifying the 45 day detention under the U.S.-Spain
Extradition Treaty).
318. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 772-73 (discussing absence of language in Treaty). The
Parretticourt failed to acknowledge the urgency requirements for provisional arrest in the
treaties. See id.; accord 1983 U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, supra note 116, art. XII, 35
U.S.T. at 1034 ("[i]n case of urgency"); U.S.-France Extradition Treaty, supra note 12, art.
IV, 37 Stat. at 1529-30 ("in case of urgency"). Instead, the court discussed the absence of
language relating to a probable cause determination. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 772-73.
The court also noted that the "hurdles" required for gathering sufficient evidence to establish probable cause were the same in the domestic and international respects. See id. at
773. This conclusion, however, does not properly respect prior case law. Compare County
of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (requiring a probable cause hearing
following arrest within 48 hours), with Wiebe, 733 F.2d at 554 (noting the necessity for a 45
day detention period due to bureaucratic sluggishness). The court failed to give proper
weight to the differences in gathering and transmitting evidence in both situations. See
Parretti,122 F.3d at 773.
319. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 773; see also supra note 83 and accompanying text (indicating the lack of major changes to the statute during its history). Although the appearance of a decision in a case that reverses years of precedent is not unusual, see INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (reversing over fifty years of precedent as to the "legislative veto"), the Ninth Circuit panel ignored the importance of subsequent practice of practicing lawyers and participating countries in international extradition under § 3184 and the
Treaty. See Vienna Convention, supra note 104, art. 31(3)(b), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27,
8 I.L.M. at 692 (requiring the consideration of subsequent practice of the parties when interpreting the treaty).
320. See Wiebe, 733 F.2d at 553 (describing the accordance of probable cause under
extradition with that for domestic criminal law). This point may be moot, however, because of a recent attack on the same statute alleging its inconsistency with the doctrine of
separation of powers. See Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65, 78 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding § 3184 unconstitutional and a violation of the separation of powers doctrine), vacated
on jurisdictionalgrounds, 82 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1996). But see Lo Duca v. United States,
93 F.3d 1100, 1108 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 3184 as non-violative of the separation of powers). For further discussion on Lobue, see generally Benjamin N. Bedrick,'
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As for the treaty itself, the court could have inferred a probable cause
standard into it, given the necessity to construe treaties liberally. 321 Instead, striking down a provision such as the one in Parrettiwould require
122
further treaty negotiations.
A final flaw of the Parrettidecision relates to the respect given to foreign judicial determinations. Although the court properly circumvented
the rule of judicial non-inquiry when it applied the Fourth Amendment
to the probable cause standard for provisional arrest, 323 the court failed to
respect the French arrest warrant's charges.324 Though the French have a
different standard from the United States for determining the sufficiency
of evidence that is required,32 the court's dismissal of the French magistrate's claims altogether was a radical step. 326 When the Supreme Court
in Grin v. Shine327 noted that a Russian arrest warrant essentially was of
the same character as an American warrant, it affirmed the importance
of respecting foreign judicial systems.3 8 At no point in its opinion did the
court in Parretti offer such deference to the French judicial system.329
Comment, United States Extradition Process: Changes in Law to Address Constitutional
Infirmity, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 385 (1997) (offering changes to extradition statute and procedure in light of Lobue); Catherine N. O'Donnell, Comment, Lobue v. Christopher: The
Unconstitutionality of the U.S. Extradition Statute, 23 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 497 (1997) (discussing Lobue and its impact on § 3184).
321. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 298 (1933).
322. See Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 1-2, Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758
(9th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-56586) (indicating the probable grave consequences the panel's
decision could have on the United States' international stature and credibility); Wiehl, supra note 39 (discussing potential impact of the panel's decision on U.S. extradition practices).
323. See Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 767 (9th Cir. 1997) (refusing to observe rule of judicial non-inquiry when constitutional rights are at stake), op. withdrawn en
banc, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998). This conclusion is in accord with prior law. See supra
note 109 (noting cases that hold that the Constitution applies to all persons found within
United States territory).
324. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 773-75.
325. See SHEARER,supra note 1, at 157. The French standard of proof is lower than
probable cause. See id. French law only requires charges or a prior conviction in order to
arrest and does not look to the sufficiency of the evidence of criminality. See id.
326. Cf.Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181,184 (1902) (acknowledging the importance of balancing the interests and rights of the detainee with the obligations owed to other countries
under U.S. treaties).
327. See id.
328. See id. at 190-91.
329. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 773-75. The court noted that the French arrest warrant
lacked a showing of credible sources underlying the allegations. See id. at 775. Even
though the AUSA may have been careless in failing to provide more information to the
magistrate in this situation, see id., a lack of judicial deference to foreign courts may set a
dangerous precedent by assuming that the French sources and the magistrate's decision
are unreliable. Cf.Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911) ("We are bound by the
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The court's assumption that the French magistrate's determination was
unreliable 331 goes against the precedent of respecting foreign judicial systems."' Such a presumption by the panel could undermine foreign judicial cooperation in future criminal matters if this deference is not acknowledged.332
The flaws in the panel's decision in Parrettiare attributable to its failure to recognize prior law describing the practical nature of extradition
and provisional arrest. These decisions have indicated that provisional
arrest is made on an urgent and informal basis. 333 Moreover, the panel's
decision to strike down § 3184 and the U.S.-France Extradition Treaty as
unconstitutional ignores earlier efforts to infer constitutional requirements into these statutes and treaties.334 Finally, the panel's failure to
give even limited deference to the French arrest warrant overlooks the
stated need for such courtesy between governments.335 On these bases,
the panel's reasoning should not be followed in future, similar cases.336
VI. CONCLUSION

The role of extradition in the international legal community is critically
important. The ability of fugitives from justice to travel and communicate quickly and easily is increasing, thereby making apprehension more
difficult. 37 As the world becomes smaller, adequate steps must be taken
existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair.").
330. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 774-75.
331. See Grin, 187 U.S. at 190-91.
332. Such deference to foreign judicial acts is based in the international law concept of
comity. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895). Comity is "the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws." Id. at 164.
333. See In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasizing
the urgency requirement for provisional arrest); United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 554
(8th Cir. 1984) (noting the bureaucratic sluggishness inherent in the extradition process as
a factor in the detainment of a fugitive); Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir.
1980) (describing the limited information required to establish probable cause for provisional arrest by comparing the nature of provisional arrest to that of extradition).
334. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 298 (1933) (describing the need for
courts to construe treaties liberally); Wiebe, 733 F.2d at 553 (describing the parallelism of
probable cause under extradition with that for domestic criminal law).
335. See Grin, 187 U.S. at 190-91 (noting the importance of respecting foreign judicial
pronouncements).
336. See supra note 41 (discussing the lack of precedential effect of the panel's decision but the likely influence its reasoning will have on future provisional arrest cases).
337. One area of particular and growing concern is the international criminal use of
the Internet and the ability for law enforcement to catch such criminals. See Frank James,
International Cyber-SWA T Teams Planned to Fight Computer Crimes: Industrial Powers
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to update the capabilities of international law enforcement officials to do
their job. These steps, however, must not be taken at the expense of the
Constitution. The Parrettidecision reflects the clash between the legitimate constitutional liberty interests of individuals and the practical and
efficiency interests of the international law enforcement community. Effectively balancing these interests remains the only means to end this
conflict and future courts will have an onerous responsibility in doing so.

Say Terrorists Capableof Major ElectronicSabotage, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 1997, at 10.
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